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THE S.E.C. AND THE SALE OF CONTROL:
AMBIVALENCE, VACILLATION OR
PUSILLANIMITY?
DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J.*

Trafficking in control of investment
trusts has reached surprising
proportions.
These are not the evils and abuses of the past.
Robert E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and
Exchange Commission (1940).1
These many years later, a highlighted review of the seventies
and eighties can readily testify to the same 'evils and abuses' in
the sale of control. 'Trafficking in control' continues to be pervasive. The phenomenon, and its attendant legal complexities, surface in every area of modern corporate enterprise: banks,
insurance companies, business corporations, investment companies, even taxation, whatever, wherever. And the samplings cover
the nation.
In the closing hours of 1974, the five-year sale-of-control Cincinnati Enquirer litigation finally concluded. 2 A militant Enquirer
minority had successfully aborted the sale of control of the Enquirer by the Scripps-Howard chain. The federal district court
emphasized the contention "that the $35 per share... constitutes
a premium and that this alleged premium should be paid to the
minority shareholders."-3 The averted premium over market totaled $5 million. The allegations ranged from breach of fiduciary
4
duty to conflict of interest and sale-of-control premium-bribery.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B., 1939, University of Detroit; M.A., 1946, Loyola University of Chicago; LL.B., 1947, LL.M.,
1948, Georgetown University; J.S.D., 1949, Yale University; S.T.L., 1953,
Loyola University of Chicago.
1. Investnent Trusts and Inv. Companies: Hearingson S. 3580 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Curency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
2. Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
3. Brief for Appellant at 59, Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1974).
4. This is a gross simplification of a highly complex litigation, summarized

(49)
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The post-trial Scripps-Howard capitulation rendered the matter
moot. Counsel were awarded $1 million.5
Even in the unsophisticated midwestern hinterland the barter
of office is commonplace. In Iowa alone, three major sale-of-control cases, all three involving insurance companies, spanned the
last decade. In Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. ,5 irate policyholders successfully argued that insiders "offered to transfer for a
substantial consideration the control of ... Le Mars Mutual ...

through the sale of the offices of the directorships." ' 7 The premium-bribe was $307,500. The total recovery-which included
post-sale-of-control looting, a frequent consequent-was $2.3
million." Le ,.larswas a case of first impression in Iowa and established Iowa as the first state to pronounce unequivocally on the
illegitimacy of the sale of control.
[W]e depend, as did the trial court, on the illegal sale of
control to set aside the transaction.
All parties agree that directorships in a corporation
are not for sale and that a contract for that purpose is
illegal and unenforceableY
Le Mars began in 1973 and concluded in 1985.
In the General United Group, litigation "I also in the Iowa state
courts, the premium-bribe was $1.4 million. The GUG policyholder contended that control of the company (1) was sold by a
local Iowa group to the notorious Equity Corporation, I' guided
in the 6th Circuit opinion, 508 F.2d at 1190-94. The sale-of-control aspect of
Rame) addressed the proposed sale of a sixty percent interest in the Cincinnati
Enquirer by the Scripps-Howard group to the management of the Enquirer. 508
F.2d at 1190-91. See generally Record and Briefs, Ramey (Nos. 74-1110 to -I116).
5. The appeal in Ramey concerned a dispute among counsel over the fee.
508 F.2d at 1194-1200.
6. 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
7. Petition in Equity, Div. I, para. 12, Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., No.
22725 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Plymouth County, May 7, 1973).
8. The lower-court award was over $6 million, including $2 million in punitive damages against the premium-briber, Iowa Mutual of De Witt. See Rowen v.
Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., No. 22725, slip op. (Iowa Dist. Ct., Plymouth County,
Oct. 3, 1977); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 661-63 (Iowa
1979). The Supreme Court of Iowa disallowed the imposition of punitive damages against Iowa Mutual, and otherwise reduced the award over three successive opinions: 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979); 347 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1984); 357
N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1984).
9. Roweni, 282 N.W.2d at 650, 659.
10. Berger v. General United Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1978).
11. Id. at 632. The Equity Corporation effected its first sale of control in
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by the adept David Milton (undoubtedly the most long-lived and
proficient of all premium-bribers, whose sale-of-control machinations covered nearly forty years' 2 ) and thence (2) passed legitimately to the Chicago-based All American group. The lawsuit
was filed in early 1975 and thrown out in 1978 on jurisdictional
grounds. The cause was merged out of existence by a cash-out
3
merger. '
The third Iowa litigation was the most egregious. Policyholders claimed variously (1) waste of assets and (2) sale of control and embezzlement involving the Des Moines-based
Statesman Group. The sale-of-control premium-bribery, $6.8
million, and the embezzlement, another $6.8 million, never
reached the merits. A $425,000 settlement was approved by the
federal district court and affirmed by a unanimous Eighth Circuit, 14 in spite of the forceful briefs pleading for recognition of
the sale-of-control premium-bribery and the embezzlement. That
was June 1986.
The bank has always been a prime target for the sale of control, especially the savings and loan. A cursory reading of the
1973 case, Beverly Hills Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board,15 might lead one to conclude that the federal court in California anathematized the sale of control and ordered the disgorgement of the $1.5-million premium-bribe over
to the bank. Certainly, the verbiage seems conclusive:
1932 and its last as late as 1966. H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 103943 (1940) [hereinafter REPORT]; Proxy Statement of General United Group, Inc.
(July 10, 1967) [hereinafter Proxy Statement]. The Equity Corporation was "notorious" insofar as its avowed purpose was "the eventual acquisition by the legal
processes of dissolution, merger, or consolidation of the assets of its subsidiaries
and of other investment companies." REPORT, supra, at 1041.
12. David M. Milton (the divorced husband of Abby, sister to the five Rockefellers) was featured in the 1936-1940 SEC Study of investment companiesalong with the slightly less notorious Floyd Odium and Wallace Groves-for his
calloused sales of control. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1039-41. For a discussion
of the SEC study of investment companies, see izfra note 31 and accompanying
text.
Finally, some 34 years later, the SEC sought an injunction in federal court
prohibiting David M. Milton from acting as an officer of any investment company. Mr. Milton consented in a stipulation to a permanent injunction. 33 SEC
ANN. REP. 110 (1967); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Milton, Civ. No. 3053
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13. Berger, 268 N.W.2d at 638-39. A simultaneous federal action begun in
1975 and based on the same transaction continued through 1985. See Shidler N.
All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1980); Shidler v. All Am. Life
& Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1985).
14. Wiener v. Roth, 791 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming lower court).
15. 371 F. Supp. 306 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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[T]he sale or transfer of control of a corporation at a
premium and the transfer of corporate offices for a consideration without complete disclosure to minority
shareholders has been widely held to constitute a breach
6
of the majority's duty to the minority.1
But the opinion was muddled, and the case can stand for little
more than another example of the prevalence of the sale of control. In 1974, a federal district court condoned the premium in
Harman v. W4illbern,1 7 involving another savings and loan. So also
in 1974 in Thompson v. Hambrick i8 in Texas. But in 1985 in the
Missouri Court of Appeals a blatant sale of control of a smalltown bank was struck down. The holding, however, was not
founded on the usual strict-trust philosophy, but rather on 'partnership' fiduciary-duty principles mandating an equal offerl' to
all 'partners' in a close corporation. Missouri, nonetheless, could
be classed with Iowa as reprobating the sale of control. This was
20
Fonnash v. Daugherty.
The predictable spate of mutual-fund sale-of-control cases
inspired by Rosenfeld v. Black 21 never materialized, but in Rosenfeld
in contradistinction to Statesman Group of the Eighth Circuit 22the Second Circuit and Judge Friendly produced one of the leading control cases of the century.
We start from one of the "well-established princi23
ples of equity," recognized in Insurance Securities itself,
. . . "that a personal trustee, corporate officer or direc16. Id. at 314-15.
17. 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir.
1975).
18. 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
19. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares,
78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965). Andrews presents a tenable theory for dealing
with the sale of control in a stock corporation when the premium-bribe is camouflaged in a majority stock sale. The theory has no applicability when the premium-bribe passes in a nonstock company or in a stock company when unrelated
to the stock, e.g., in collateral nonstock dealings between an incumbent contr6leur and the premium-bribing successor. The deficiency in Andrews theory
lies in the absence of a philosophical base for outlawing the premium-bribe.
20. 697 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
21. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. Wiener v. Roth, 791 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1986).
23. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
Insurance Secnrities will figure prominently over the coming pages. It and Rosetfeld v. Black are central to any discussion of the SEC and the sale of control of
mutual funds.
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tor, or other person standing in a fiduciary relationship
with another, may not sell or transfer such office for personal gain." There are ample authorities to support this
proposition.

24

In this limited sale-of-control area of 'trafficking in control of investment trusts' the paradigmatic Rosenfeld will help form the
future.
The 1974 Tax Court case, Estate of William du Pont,Jr.,25 offers
a fascinating, although obiter, commentary on the philosophy of
the sale of control. For years, the Internal Revenue Service has
countenanced a premium in the sale of control:
[C]ontrol of a corporation .... representing as it does an
added element of value, may justify a higher value for a
26
specific block of stock.
Since respective counsel regrettably never argued to the core issue in Du Pont, some important insights into the sale-of-control
27
rationale were never forthcoming.
Whither the SEC?
Aloof and seemingly disdainful of this disturbing control melange, 28 stands impassively the chief federal guardian of corporate morality, derelict in one major area where its leadership
could set the example. As the bellwether, the SEC could lead the
way for all. The Congress has charged the Commission with a
general mandate "to provide protection for investors."2 9 Specifically, and relevantly, the Commission has direct custody over investment companies and consequently, must scrutinize closely
any 'traffic in their control.' The impact of forceful and uncom24. Rosenfeld, 445 F.2d at 1342 (quoting Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir. 1958)).
25. Estate of William du Pont, Jr. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 746 (1975).
26. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.02(g).
27. A study of the briefs at the Tax Court level indicates that the principal
emphasis has been on expert testimony with no argument on the intrinsic right
or wrong of a premium for control. Yet, if such a premium is turpitidinons, no
added value could be assessed on a control block and hence no added tax.
28. L.est one might think the sale-of-control premium-bribe is evanescent.
note that the Sulzbergers do not think so: "Under the new provisions lanong
the controlling family members], the Class B shares will be priced at the market
value of the class A shares. This eliminates the possibility that a family member
could gain any of the premium that is customarily payable for control shares."
Iewin, 7Drues aod Sulzbergers 7oke Steps to Keep Compaoy 'oder Family. N.Y. LFimes.
.lune 20, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (midwest cd.).
29. SECURITIES & Excr. COMM'N, THE WORK ov THE SEC 3 (1986).
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promising SEC leadership in this narrow but important field of
the mutual fund would be incalculable. Such Commission leadership would undoubtedly span out beyond the sale-of-control fundamentals applied to the mutual-fund industry and be an
exemplary force across the board: for banks, business corporations, insurance companies, tax claims, whatever, wherever.
This, then, is an 'open letter' to the Commission. The hope
is a reassumption of the role it abandoned some 25 years ago and
an embrace once again of the pristine dogma so staunchly supported for three decades. In 1956, the Commission's credo was
categorical. Witness the Commission's brief in the crucial SEC v.
Insurance Securities, Inc.:
We believe that .

.

. there can be no dispute about

the fundamental propositions that a fiduciary cannot exploit his position of trust for his own benefit by selling
his office directly, through the sale of stock control, or in
any other manner. This is well-established in equity with
respect to trustees, receivers, administrators,guardians, and corporate directors or officers. It has been set forth time and
again . . . [by] courts of equity, and has received the full
endorsement of authoritative commentators. . . . [T]he
fiduciary ... may [not] auction off his position on the eve

of retirement as an additional reward for work well
o
done.
Clearly the Commission had no thought that this 'fundamental
proposition' so 'well established in equity' was limited solely to
mutual funds. Rather, the reach of the proposition rightly embraces "trustees, receivers, administrators, guardians, and corporate directors or officers." This conviction of the Commission
should shape the coming decades. No official spokesman bears a
bigger burden for the legal and ethical well-being of our corporate system.
The Thesis of the Open Letter
The Securities and Exchange Commission (1) in its earliest years
opposed uncompromisingly the premium-bribery in the sale of control, (2) diligently elaborateda tenable philosophy supporting this
opposition, and (3) then, in the face of adversity, inexplicablyfled
30. Brief for the Securiies & Exch. Comm'n, at 55-56, Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cel. delied, 358 U.S. 823

(1958) (emphasis added) Ihereinafter Bricli.
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the field. The Commission has been either genuinely perplexed,
unfortunately wavering or regrettably timid. The last seems closest to the mark.
The development of the Commission's control philosophy
occupied twenty years beginning in 1936, just two years after the
Commission's creation, and reached full flower toward the end of
1956. During these decades, the Commission studiously spelled
out its fundamentals of corporate control and defended them
mordicus whenever necessary. Throughout, the Commission's
stance was unwaveringly uniform. The years 1936-1956, therefore, are pivotal and supply the content to the SEC philosophy
that will establish the thesis set for proof.
These years and this philosophy-this open letter-will be
approached in three parts: I AN HISTORICAL CONSPECTUS; II THE
SEC PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL; III CONCLUSION: THE
COMMISSION FLEES THE FIELD.

I.

AN HISTORICAL CONSPECTUS

From the standpoint of the SEC philosophy of corporate control, the years from 1936 to 1956 presented an integrated picture
of unvarying consistency and doctrinal unity. An historical chronology of this period, therefore, does not deserve particular emphasis. True, milestones do mark the way, but the unbroken
conformity among the official studies, reports and releases obviates the necessity of special commentary from the historical aspect. Some sense of chronology of the major Commission saleof-control pronouncements, however, should be helpful in understanding the overall formulation of the Commission's position.
This historical conspectus is punctuated by five documents,
and these documents are the milestones along the road to the
development of the Commission's philosophy: (1) The 1936-1940
SEC Study;"' (2) The 1942 Opinion of the Commission's General Consel;
(3) The Incorporated Investors Case; (4) The 1955 SEC.-nnual Report; and (5) The Insurance Securities Litigation.
31. This catch-all description has been used to include the broad SE'C activity, 1936 to 1940, not onlV the work of the Study of investnment trusts and investment companies and the direct product of the Study, the 1938-1940 SEC
Report. but also, somewhat loosely, the Senate Hearings of 1940. conducted
toward the Investment Company Act of 1940. The 1938- 1940 SEC Report was
published in seven volumes and six slpplements. See iqfiv note 33. The Senate
Hearings are contained in four volumes. See supra note I. The nature and content of these volumes will be specified apropos.
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The 1936-1940 SEC Study

In 1935, when the Commission was only one year old and
Joseph P. Kennedy was still Chairman, the Congress, in passing
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, (as the Senate hearings
made clear) "not only authorized, but directed, the Securities and
Exchange Commission to make a study of investment trusts and
investment companies, and to report its findings and recommendations to the Congress." 32 This four-year Study-from 1936 to
1940-under the general supervision of Commissioner Robert E.
Healy, supplied the bulk of the raw material for the corpus of the
Commission's philosophy. The resultant, voluminous 1938-1940
SEC Report 3 3-and the concomitant Senate hearings 3 4 held pursuant to the drafting of the Investment Company Act of 1940contained, even at that early date, all the seminal principles for
the formal construction of the SEC primer on corporate control.
Of course the 1936-1940 Study-as well as the 1938-1940 SEC
32. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 33.
33. The overall Report of the SEC, entitled Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies, consists of five parts: (1) Part I was sent to the Congress on June 10,
1938 and is entitled "The Nature, Classification, and Origin of Investment Companies," H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); (2) Part II, "Statistical
Analysis of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies" (submitted to the
Congress on March 10, 1939), H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939);
(3) Part III, "Abuses and Deficiencies in the Organization and Operation of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies" (which discusses the evils and malpractices of the investment trusts and companies, and was submitted to the
Congress in separate sections on August 7, 1939 and February 8, 1940), H.R.
Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), and H.R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1940); (4) Part IV, "Economic Significance in Control of Industry" and
(5) Part V, "Conclusions and Recommendations" (submitted June 9, 1941),
H.R. Doc. No. 246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess (1941). In addition, six supplemental
reports were submitted to the Congress in 1939-1940. See H.R. Doc. No. 246,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (complete listing of all Reports submitted in connection with the Study). Part III, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1940) [cited throughout as REPORT], provides the materials for this "open letter" to the Commission.
In addition to the general preparatory work of the Study, the SEC itself
conducted public examinations of 250 companies. In these public hearings by
the Commission, the companies examined were represented by counsel and
were entitled to cross-examine witnesses produced by the Commission and to
present evidence through witnesses of their own choosing. The record of these
public examinations consisted of 33,000 pages of transcript and 4,800 exhibits.
The record was not printed by Congress and therefore is only available in typewritten form from the Commission in Washington, D.C. Senate Hearings, supra
note 1,at 40-4 1.
34. A Subcommittee on Securities and Exchange of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, tinder the chairmanship of Senator Robert F. Wagner of
New York, conducted hearings over a 20-day period in April and for two days in
late May and June, 1940. These hearings resulted in the Investment Company
Act of 1940. Senate Ilearings, sutpra note 1.
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Report and the Senate hearings-covered the entire mutual-fund
field, but the 'evils and abuses' in 'trafficking in control' figure
prominently and consistently throughout the years of study and
the weeks of testimony.
David Schenker was the chief counsel and operating director
of the Study. His trenchant insights are evident throughout these
formative years. This 1936-1940 SEC Study-as broadly described to include the Study itself as well as the SEC Report of
1938-1940 and the Senate hearings-necessarily ranks as the basic influence on, and a major statement of, the Commission's saleof-control philosophy. In substantive content it is almost on a par
35
with the key Insurance Securities material.
2.

The 1942 Opinion of the Commission's General Counsel

Since the 'evils and abuses' of the twenties and thirties continued on into the forties, even after the passage of the 1940 Act,
the Commission on May 11, 1942-in an SEC Release under the
Investment Company Act-"made public an opinion of its General Counsel, Chester T. Lane." 3 6 This opinion was the first formal statement of the Commission's policy developed over the
four years of the 1936-1940 SEC Study. The brevity of the opinion-it was only two pages-and the uncompromising firmness of
the declaration jointly contributed to its impact on the financial
and business community. Its lack, however, of discursive philosophical commentary renders it less important as a doctrinal
source.
3.

The Incorporated Investors Case

The continuity of the SEC position during the 1936-1956 decades was preserved by an inconspicuous SEC Release in 1954
3: 7
under the Investment Company Act, In re Incorporated Investors.
IncorporatedInvestors was notable for what it left unsaid, for its unspoken assumptions and the routine manner of its issuance. The
matter involved a legitimate 'transfer of control' (in contradistinction to an illegitimate 'sale of control' involving a premium-bribe)
and was later adduced by the Commission as a prototypal exam35. Brief, supra note 30.
36. Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, Investment Company Act Release No. 40-354, [1941-1944 Dec.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
75,281 (May 11, 1942).
37. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, Investment Company Act Release No.
1947 [1952-56 Dec.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,058 (Feb. 3, 1954).
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pie of what the Commission expected at the time of the transfer
of an investment-advisory contract.38 The Commission regarded
Incorporated Investors as an "illuminating illustration of the principle" long reflected in "the historic trust obligations prescribed by
courts of equity."'3 9 As with the 1942 SEC Release containing the
opinion of the Commission's general counsel, IncorporatedInvestors
was more exemplary than substantive.
4.

The 1955 SEC Annual Report

The Commission's 21 st Annual Report of its activities for its
fiscal 1955 year was noteworthy for two relatively minor reasons.
First, it reinvigorated the 1942 Opinion of General Counsel Lane
with the firm announcement that "the purported transfer of an
investment advisory contract for a consideration would constitute
a gross abuse of trust and be the subject of Commission action." 40 Second, the Annual Report made it clear that the premium-bribery and trafficking in control of earlier decades was still
rampant in 1955: "Such questions arose with increasing fre4
quency during the fiscal year." '
5.

The Insurance Securities Litigation

In 1956, the contr6leurs of Insurance Securities, Incorporated, a mutual fund, allegedly sold their control for a $4.37-million premium-bribe. This flagrant violation of the twenty yearold SEC proscription against the barter of office necessarily
goaded the Commission into legal action and consequently, a
conscious formulation of the philosophy that lay scattered
through the many volumes of the 1940 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies. Defeat on the federal
district level 42 forced the Commission at last to excogitate an integrated philosophical system in preparing the appeal. The result
was an invaluable SEC corpus juris of corporate control. The
Commission's detailed and clearly enunciated position throughout the Insurance Securities litigation will form the philosophical
framework for yet further refinement drawn from other SEC pronouncements, principally the 1938-1940 SEC Report. The collec38. Brief, supra note 30, at 78-79.
39. Id.
40. 21 SEC ANN. REP. 100 (1955).
41. Id.
42. Securities & Exch. Conim'n %v.
Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778
(N.D.Cal. 1956), alftd, 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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Commission

effort

of

Insurance

Securities,

however,

undoubtedly constitutes the preeminent treatise on the SEC philosophy of corporate control. This treatise then will accordingly
constitute the heart of this study, but abetted of course by the
other supporting SEC materials.
Henceforward only obiter adversion will be made to this historical chronology. With this chart in the background, the emphasis will be on the substantive philosophy, regardless of
particular dates and periods within the two decades of 1936-1956.
Since these 20 years are a philosophical unit, individual historical
hills and valleys are not too important.
II.

THE

SEC

PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL

During the 20 years of 1936-1956, the Commission methodically added bit by bit to the somewhat amorphous mass of facts,
memoranda and releases which in globo constituted a complete,
albeit unorganized, philosophy of corporate control. The Commission's philosophical position was unmistakable, but the various principles, subprinciples and seemingly disparate corollaries
of this position had not yet been synthesized into a coherent
corpus.
This synthesis and the final elaboration of a coherent corpus
of the Commission's philosophy was achieved in four steps:
(1) The Landmark Insurance Securities Litigation; (2) The SEC Brief"
The Authoritative Voice of the Commission; (3) The Commission's Official
Position; and (4) The Corpus of the Commission Philosophy.
1.

The Landmark Insurance Securities Litigation

From its inception in 1938, Insurance Securities, Inc.-an independent Delaware corporation based in Oakland, Californiawas the typical jack-of-all-trades so characteristic of the mutualfund service company. ISI was especially designed by its promoters to (1) create and sponsor its very own mutual fund, (2) manage the fund's day-to-day operations, (3) select the fund's
portfolio of securities, (4) provide continuing investment advice,
and to cap it off (5) fill the role of principal underwriter. 4 3 In
short, ISI was to perform every conceivable function a mutualfund service company-or even a mutual fund itself, for that matter-could possibly perform. And it was very closely held. By
43. Record at 4-6, Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254

F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958) [hereinafter Record].
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1956, the year of the SEC litigation, ISI had a total of nine shareholders. No more. Four of these, individual defendants, Leach,
Carr, Lonergan and Haight, were directors and officers and held
72.6 percent of the outstanding shares. 44 The balance, 27.4 percent, was held by the other five. The Leach Group was the untrammeled contr6leur of ISI.
The "Trust Fund"
But obviously the Leach Group had thoughts far broader
than an isolated service company. And these thoughts coalesced
in the "Trust Fund." The Trust fund was created contemporaneously with ISI, and 'creature' indeed it was. In truth, the Trust
Fund was wraithlike. It had virtually no body, no discernible life
of its own, and was wholly dependent on ISI for every vital
function.
The Trust Fund was not a corporation, but was organized
under California law pursuant to a Trust Agreement. Necessarily
it had no shareholders, merely public investors who contributed
their funds and received Participation Agreements. Thanks to
continuous Participation offerings, the investing public swelled
the net assets of the Trust Fund to $215 million by 1955. 4 5 The
$215 million of public investment was in turn invested in stocks of
various insurance companies. Hence, Insurance Securities, Inc.
Moreover, the Leach Group had been thorough. Their control of this $215 million was absolutely unfettered. The public
investors had no general voting rights. The Trust Fund-unlike
most mutual funds-had no officers of its own, no board of directors, no voice at all beyond the annual and perfunctory necessity
of approving the all-embracing service contract with ISI. (In fact,
ISI itself had only about $1 million in total assets and its Shareholders Equity was only $300,488. 4 1) The Trust Agreement, pursuant to section 15 of the Investment Company Act, 4 7 provided
further that an assignment by ISI of the service contract triggered
automatic termination, and necessitated investor-approved
48
reinstatement.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 7, 16-17.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1982) (enacted in 1940).
Record, supra note 43, at 6, 7.
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A Point for Emphasis
The interjection of a separate corporate entity, ISI, between
the contr6leur of ISI, the Leach Group and the public investors'
$215 million in the Trust Fund could be a red herring, and perhaps divert attention from a salient fact in this entire study: The
four human beings of the Leach Group had unhampered control
over the public $215 million, regardless of the legal fictions separating them. This was the 'control' about to be sold. How may it
thus be said so firmly that the four had-and hence were able to
sell-control of these public dollars? The answer: (1) The Leach
Group owned a majority of ISI stock. The public owned none.
(2) ISI, aliis verbis the Leach Group, had the unchallenged control of the proxy mechanism of the Trust Fund. (3) The invariable sheepishness of the public Participation shares guaranteed a
near-unanimous vote of approval of any matter submitted in a
Trust Fund proxy. No public investor ever voted against the
Leach Group. 4 9 (4) Transfer of control over the proxy, therefore,
was transfer of control of the Trust Fund. Infallible. No third
party could or did dictate to the Leach Group. Thus, when these
four men accepted a $4.37-million premium to hand over control
of the proxy, that premium carried control over $215 million in
public money. This is what it means to say that the Leach Group
was the untrammeled contr6leur of the Trust Fund, and the public $215 million. To speak, therefore, of the sale of control of ISI
is to speak of the sale of control of the Trust Fund, and the investors' dollars.
This disturbing fact of mutual-fund life was in the forefront
of Commission thinking when it began its attack on the 'evils and
abuses' of 'trafficking in control.' The reams of 1936-1940 testimony taught the Commission these elemental lessons:
In the absence of a substantial stock interest
managers of investment companies held control either
because of the inertia of stockholders combined with ...
control of the proxy machinery or by means of long-term
management contracts. To acquire control in these situations, the acquiring company purchased the management contracts at attractive prices. These management
contracts usually had been taken by the sponsors of in49. Thus the Brief: "[Clontrol of the proxy machinery, combined with the
natural prestige of management and aided by the apathy of investors, effectively
assured the election of the sponsor's nominees." Brief, supra note 30, at 32.
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vestment companies prior to the public sale of the company's securities. They were solely the result of self5
dealing upon the part of the sponsors. "
The "control," whatever its source, had the pecuniary characteristic of salability at attractive prices."'
Just as the Trust Fund did nothing for itself, so ISI on its part
did nothing 5 2 except its fivefold business with the Trust Fund.
Expectably, the coffers of ISI (that is, the nine sole owners of ISI)
were rewarded handsomely for this stewardship of the Trust
Fund. As a starter, ISI began with a 'Creation Fee,' or sales load,
for each sale of a Participation Agreement to the public investor.
Then ISI added an annual 'Management Fee' for running the dayto-day operations. And finally, an 'Advisory Fee' for supervising
the portfolio. For the three-year period ending with the SEC ac53
tion, ISI exacted over $10 million in fees from the Trust Fund.
"The Sale of Control of ISI" 54

This was the scene in early 1956 when the Leach Group "embarked upon a plan to sell their controlling stock interest to a
small group of purchasers. The sales were arranged through Kai55
ser & Co., an investment banker in San Francisco, California."
The price paid for the stock was $50 per share, although
the net asset value of the ISI stock as of June 30, 1956,
was only $1.81 per share. [Citation.] For its services,
56
Kaiser & Co. received a beneficial interest in the stock.
Thus the four sellers received a $4.37-million premium for the
sale of the control block of stock. The four members of the Leach
Group itself sold only 40% of the ISI shares-out of a total
72.6%-in several successive transactions (which the court
treated as a moral unit) and the balance was acquired by the Kaiser Group from four of the five other ISI stockholders.5 7 Under
the Act, this sale constituted a transfer of control from the Leach
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

REPORT, supra note 11, at 1089.

Id. at 1066.
Record, supra note 43, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Brief, supra note 30, at 6.
Id.

56. Id. at 7.
57. Record, supra note 43, at 9,58.
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Group to Leland M. Kaiser and his cohorts. 5
The Proxy Solicitation
Inspired by the mandate of the Act, 59 "ISI commenced the
solicitation of proxies for a meeting of investors ... to vote on...
the reinstatement of the investment advisory and principal underwriting contracts between ISI and the Trust Fund. ' '6° Investors,
of course, were urged to act favorably on these and other proposals." ' Stress again that this vote was strictly perfunctory, and that
the assured investor approval was the key to the Leach Group's
ability to sell control to the Kaiser Group.
Conveniently and predictably,
[t]he proxy material did not disclose the details of the
transactions that led to the change in control of ISI. Nor
were investors told of the net asset value of the ISI stock
and the price the director-defendants were paid for their
2
stock."
Repeat also the obvious that to speak of the sale of control of ISI
is to speak of the sale of control of the Trust Fund.
The SEC Suit
On August 13, 1956, the Commission instituted an action
against ISI, the Leach Group and Leland M. Kaiser, alleging
that the payment for stock control at $50 per share, as
against net asset value of $1.81 per share, represented
no payment for any asset or assets owned by ISI; that the
purchase price reflected the value of the ... substantial
fees from the Trust Fund under the investment advisory
and principal underwriting contracts . . . and . . . being
an asset of the Trust Fund, equitably belongs to the
Trust Fund. 653
"For appropriating such. pecuniary advantages to their own account and benefit and for profiting from their fiduciary relation58. Under Section 2(a)(9) of the Act, 25 percent or more of the voting stock
of a company constitutes presumptive control. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1982).
59. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a) and -15(b) (1982).
60. Brief, supra note 30, at 11.
61. Record, supra note 43, at 21.
62. Brief, supra note 30, at 11.
63. Id. at 12.
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ship to the Trust Fund," 64 the Commission sought: (1) The
disgorgement by the Leach Group of the $4.37 million premiumbribe over to the Trust Fund and (2) the Permanent removal of
65
the Kaiser Group from control of both ISI and the Trust Fund.
On November 29, 1956, the federal district court in California granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. 6 6 The Kaiser Group, now in control, had agreed
not to vote the proxies until after judicial determination of the
basic issues. Since the SEC lost on both district and circuit levels,
the election later went forward. Even in the face of the SEC lawsuit the sheepish investors confirmed the invulnerability of the
Kaiser Group control-with its domination of the proxy mechanism-by approving the new contract. Thus was the sale of control from Leach to Kaiser consummated.
2.

The SEC Brief. The Authoritative Voice of the Commission

The brief of the Commission filed with the Ninth Circuit in
July 1957 ran some 112 pages and constituted the very synthesis
of the Commission's control philosophy that had been lacking for
some twenty years. Here was a thorough, exact and formal statement, cohesive and technical, of the Commission's thinking on
the sale of control.
Granted, one could persuasively argue that the Commission's
position had long been adequately expressed in (1) the many
volumes of the 1940 SEC Report, (2) the 1942 Opinion of the
Commission's General Counsel, (3) the IncorporatedInvestors Case
and (4) the 1955 SEC Annual Report. But this unconnected congeries of statements lacked the cohesive, and to an appreciable
extent the authoritative, force of the Circuit Brief. Thus, perhaps
as important as the quality and completeness of the Brief was the
indisputable authority with which it spoke.
During the chairmanship of Ralph H. Demmler (1953-1955),
the Commission instituted a practice that was to guarantee to the
SEC Brief the authenticity of an official SEC imprimatur. Chairman Demmler had insisted that the five-man Commission itself
first review and then personally clear all briefs before they were
filed. The avowed purpose of the Demmler approach stemmed
64. Id.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778,
781 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823
(1958).
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from a conviction that the Commission's philosophy of the law
must exert a maximum impact on the financial and legal community. This Demmler policy consequently included a painstaking
study by the Commissioners themselves of the content and expression of the all-important legal philosophy that necessarily
permeated and guided the Commission's briefs. Interestingly,
moreover, these were by no means New Deal days. Chairman
Demmler and the Commission were almost militantly determined
to impregnate the thinking of the day with the traditional, conservative, Republican view of the law.
Among the five Commissioners during the Demmler chairmanship was J. Sinclair Armstrong, Esq., who assumed the Chairmanship on May 25, 1955, and was incumbent from the
beginning to the end of Insurance Securities and the ISI Brief.
Hence the methodical procedures of review and clearance-and
the philosophical scrutiny-of the Demmler period continued un67
changed throughout the tenure of Chairman Armstrong.
Moreover, the days of Insurance Securities and the ISI Brief fell
during the incumbency of the forceful Thomas G. Meeker, Esq. as
General Counsel. Mr. Meeker, as chief counsel on the Brief, was
scrupulous in getting full Commission approval of his work.
(Aaron Levy, Esq. did the yeoman work under the day-to-day supervision of General Counsel Meeker.) Because of the implementation of this Commission policy by both Messrs. Armstrong and
Meeker, the ISI Brief was more truly the official work of the Commission than, for example, it would have been under Chester
Lane or Louis Loss.
Furthermore, the Insurance Securities litigation occasioned
such unusual concern in the mutual-fund industry that it received
even more meticulous scrutiny by the Commission than other
briefs of the period. Frequent memoranda circulated through the
Commission. Hours and hours of debate honed the issues and
refined the final product. Nor did the industry lack vocal representatives. Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., among many, vigorously argued
the position of the Investment Company Institute (Jaretzki of Sullivan & Cromwell was lead counsel for the ISI defendants and
later the partisan author of several journal articles on the subject). 8 Over this period, nothing received more serious attention
67. The ISI Circuit Brief was datedJuly, 1957. Mr. Armstrong relinquished
the chairmanship on May 27, 1957. 23 SEC ANN. REP. xii (1957). Therefore,
even were the Demmler-Armstrong policy to have ceased abruptly with the resignation, the Brief nonetheless would have felt its full impact.

68. Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW &
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than Insurance Securities and the ISI Brief.
Remarkably (at the insistence of Leland M. Kaiser himself,
the ISI investment banker, leader of the Kaiser Group, contr6leur
of both ISI and the Trust Fund and a principal defendant, whose
political influence was not inconsiderable) both Senator Fulbright
and Senator Dirksen actively intervened to insure a forceful presentation of the mutual-fund-industry position. In a word, by the
time the Commission's control philosophy was reduced to formal
presentation in the ISI Brief, it had been debated, reviewed and
refined with precision. No doubt could remain, therefore, that
this ISI Brief was the authentic and authoritative pronouncement
of the Securities and Exchange Commission on its philosophy of
the sale of corporate control.
3.

The Commission's Official Position

Early in the Brief, the Commission presented a succinct statement of the underlying rationale of this sale-of-control philosophy. The twenty years of 'evils and abuses' of 'trafficking in
control' had conditioned the Commission for uncompromising
forthrightness:
We believe that . . . there can be no dispute about the
fundamental proposition that a fiduciary cannot exploit
his position of trust for his own benefit by selling his office directly, through the sale of stock control, or in any
other manner. 69
The elaboration of this basic SEC thesis was the principal burden
of the ISI Brief.
The SEC and Equity
Since the Commission had been expressly entrusted with the
enforcement of the Investment Company Act, the ISI litigation
was necessarily approached at the outset under the aegis of the
Act. The attack relied on two principal sections:
Section 15(a) requires that the investment advisory
contract must be approved initially by a vote of the investors or their board of directors. A vote is also required for the annual renewal of the contract. The
CONTEMP. PROBS. 777 (1964);Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act: Problems Relat-

ing to Investment Advisory Contracts, 45 VA. L.
69. Brief, supra note 30, at 55-56.
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contract is non-assignable and is automatically terminated upon assignment by the investment adviser.
Section 36 provides for the judicial removal of an investment adviser or principal underwriter where, in an action by the Commission, it is determined that such
investment adviser or principal underwriter is guilty of
"gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" in respect of
70
the registered investment company.
However, the Commission made it emphatically clear that it
would be improper to construe "the voting requirements under
Section 15 as a substitute for the fiduciary standards incorporated in
Section 36."'7 Obviously, for present purposes this emphasis by
the Commission is most important. The Commission bottomed
its argument on the strict-trust philosophy of traditional equity.
The Commission was unequivocal: "Section 36 derives its meaning from historic equitable principles which are incorporated
therein and from the statutory purposes and policies of the
72
Act."
The sense of philosophical cohesiveness and continuity over
the twenty-year span, 1936-1956, prompted the Commission,
whenever appropriate, to buttress the argumentation of the ISI
Brief with relevant historical support, from pronouncements of
both Commission and courts. Thus, in seeking confirmation of its
interpretation of the equitable approaches of Section 36, the
Commission advertently viewed Section 36 "in the light of the
Opinion of the Commission's General Counsel made public on
May 11, 1942, which sets forth as Commission policy the construction of Section 36 now urged by the Commission in this
73
case."
Even further, the Commission saw strict trust and equity at
the foundation of the legislative intent permeating the Act:
Since the Congress could not in detail proscribe every
means or device by which a faithless fiduciary might exploit his position of trust for his own account and benefit, the broad and inclusive provisions of Section 36 and
the equitableprinciples embodied therein are of central impor70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

3.
16 (emphasis added).
17.
8.
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tance in the enforcement of fiduciary standards.7 4
Time and again throughout the Brief (and for that matter
throughout all the documents of 1936-1956) the Commission reiterated its reliance on principles far more fundamental than the
literal language of Section 15 and Section 36: "We submit that all
of these [equitable] doctrines were incorporated by the Congress
into Section 36 and should be enforced by a court when its equitable jurisdiction is invoked thereunder." 75 And again:
Accordingly, in construing Section 36, the court, as a
court of equity, should apply the historic equitable principles to their fullest extent, and thus give due and
proper effect to the statutory measures and policies
76
which Section 36 was designed to implement.
Probably the most ringing statement of the Commission's reliance on strict trust and equity came midway in the Brief:
There is no need to emphasize that the conceptions
of fiduciary duty and remedy exemplified in these cases
were not created by statute. They were developed by
courts of equity as instruments of public policy in order
to prevent corrosion of the fiduciary responsibilities of
those who have undertaken to manage money or prop77
erty of others or to act on their behalf.
Not only is the ISI Brief the authoritative voice of the Commission, but it is a formal statement of a broad philosophy of
strict trust and equity, and is by no means a narrow application of
two specific sections of the Act. In truth, the Brief is traditional
equity, pure and simple, applied to the sale of control of a mutual
fund.
The Intent of Congress
Perhaps more to the point, it would be myopic to ascribe the
philosophy of Insurance Securities and the ISI Brief exclusively to
the SEC. The Commission, after all, was conscientiously attempting to implement the will of the Congress, so clearly expressed in
the legislative history of the 1940 Act. Thus the Brief:
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

18 (emphasis added).
20.
28.
66.
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The purpose of Section 36 ...is to enforce fiduciary
standards with respect to the management of investment
companies .... This is one of the main themes of the
Act, since, as the Congress found, investment companies, by reason of their liquidity and the marketability of
their portfolio securities, had been particularly susceptible of abuse. One of the major abuses stemmed from
the management contract, which was not only a lucrative
source of income but also an instrument of control and,
as such, was the subject of indiscriminate trading by and
78
for the benefit of management.
This open letter directed to the Commission, therefore, could appropriately command congressional attention as well, since the
Congress, too, has been neglectful of its avowed determination to
eradicate "[o]ne of the major abuses stemm[ing] from the management contract which was... an instrument of control and...
the subject of indiscriminate trading." 79 The Commission identified its objectives and philosophy with the objectives and philosophy of the Congress:
The Commission's interpretation of Sections 15 and
36 aids in the achievement of the legislative policy to
eliminate trading in investment advisory and principal
underwriting contracts. . . . Succession to these contracts may once more be put on the auction block for
sale to the highest bidder for the benefit of management,
and the purchasers may be tempted to pursue hazardous
or doubtful policies in order to recoup as quickly as possible the substantial price they paid for stock control and
80
the succession of the agreements.
The Commission was convinced that the copious findings of fact
of 1936-1940 presented in the 1940 SEC Report became an integral part of the legislative history of the 1940 Act.
As indicated in the legislative history, the Act is "the
outgrowth of a comprehensive study and investigation of
investment trusts and investment companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the direction of the Congress." The Commission's reports
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 22.
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covered every phase of the operations of investment
companies and their management. These reports have
been published by the Congress in several volumes
under the title, SEC Report on the Study of Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies. .

.

. [T]here was unanimous

agreement that the evils and abuses disclosed in the
Commission's reports required intervention through
Federal legislation in "the national public interest and
81
the interest of investors."
Later, the Commission again recurred in its Brief to the congressional involvement in the elimination of sale-of-control premium-bribery:
The legislative history revealed that many abuses
had resulted from the trafficking in management contracts. For such contracts were not only a lucrative
source of income but also effective instruments of control. . . . [F]or the benefits of such control the sponsor or
management was able to exact a substantial price from
82
the purchaser.
At another point in the Brief the Commission recognized the interrelation of Commission and Congress in pursuing the same
objectives and philosophy:

[W]e do not, of course, lose sight of the fact that we are
concerned here with a . . .legislative determination to

extirpate the baneful trafficking in fiduciary contracts,
the results of which had brought grief and disaster to
public investors. .

.

. [T]he Congress intended to adopt

measures equal to the task and purpose, so that the protection against these pernicious practices shall extend to
83
all investors under all contingencies.
4.

The Corpus of the Commission Philosophy

Faced with the self-imposed necessity of expressing the SEC
stand in a cogent and coherent presentation in the Circuit Brief,
the Commission elaborated its sale-of-control philosophy in five
logical, cumulatively progressive arguments: (A) The Custodial
81. Id. at 28.
82. Id. at 31-32.
83. Id. at 82. 83.
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Concept of Corporate Control; (B) The Suitability of the Successor Contrjleur; (C) The Premium-Bribe; (D) The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe; (E) The Triple Sanction: Disgorgement, Damages, Dismissal.
A.

The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control

Pursuant to its congressional mandate and within the context
of "historic equitable principles," 8 4 the Commission began the
erection of its control philosophy by an enunciation of the fundamental concept of 'fiduciary duty.' Essential to the ultimate liability of the Leach Group and the successor Kaiser Group-as with
all contr6leurs-was the ultimate obligation of fiduciaries:
ISI clearly stood in a fiduciary relationship to the Trust
Fund; and directors and officers, who were also controlling stockholders of ISI, stood in a like fiduciary relationship. As such, ISI and its directors and officers were
under an affirmative duty to exercise their fiduciary responsibilities for the benefit of the Trust Fund and its
public investors.8 5
Repeatedly, the Brief of the Commission sketched the broad perspective within which it viewed the responsibilities of the contr6leur of a mutual fund:
[I]n response to the growth of the modern corporation
and its attendant complexities, courts of equity have exercised greater vigilance in the enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities, and equitable remedies have been correspondingly expanded to meet these developments. The
same degree of vigilance and perception should be
credited to the Congress .... Under the Act ...one of
the basic purposes was to strengthen and raise the level
of fiduciary standards, not to weaken or lower it.Y
Throughout, the Commission emphasized that its determination
merely reflected:
[A] Congressional determination that the investment advisor and principal underwriter each occupies a fiduciary
office in respect of the investment company; that his contractual agreement with the company constitutes an un84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. at 16.
86. Id. at 21.
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dertaking of a fiduciary character.8 7
And again: "[T]he investment advisory and principal underwriting agreements are not mere commercial arrangements but are,
'
fundamentally, fiduciary undertakings. "88
Custody, the Foundation of the Duty
Understandably, however, the Commission did not rest content with such fiduciary generalizations. Rather, it detailed and
specified the fundamental substructure underlying these truisms.
This is not to derogate in the least, however, from the efficacy and
applicability of these broad "historic equitable principles" 8 9 and
"fiduciary responsibilities." 9 0 To the contrary, 'the fiduciary duty
of corporate control' 9 ' is a very real concept and outlines norms
of conduct directly antithetical to the laxity and laissez-faire so
prevalent over the last 75 years. "But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis," 9 2 only states the problem, and the
Commission knew this full well. Hence, it traced with some particularity the ultimate rationale of the fiduciary duty of the mutual-fund contr~leur, or of any other "trustees, receivers,
93
administrators, guardians and corporate directors or officers,"
whomever, wherever. This ultimate rationale? The custody of
the investors' assets. Throughout its Brief, the Commission
evinced a clear understanding that the final source of responsibility, and hence of fiduciary obligation, lay in the untrammeled custody of other people's money, with the accent on 'untrammeled.'
Confidence/Reliance/Dependence
At that intense instant of appropriation, when the
total corporate entity, all the assets, the future of the
firm, pass into his hands, the contr6leur becomes a complete custodian. He becomes the ultimate power over
the corporate destinies. This complete dominion corre87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 21.
See D. BAYNE,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL:
ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DuTY (1986).

A

TREATISE

92. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86

(1942).
93. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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spondingly begets total entity dependence, with neces94
sary reliance, and confidence, willy-nilly.
Which is another way of saying that the genesis of all responsibility lies in the total dependence of the dependent entity on the
independent entity. Over and over, the Commission drummed in
this total dependence of the public investor and the corresponding total independence of the Leach and Kaiser factions:
It is conceded that ISI is the sponsor, manager, and
investment advisor of the Trust Fund, as well as its principal underwriter; that ISI has no other business; and
that the fees from the Trust Fund are the sole source of
ISI's income. Since its organization in 1938, the Trust
Fund has had no independent management of its own
and ISI has performed all essential management functions for the Trust Fund. 9 5
In this succinct paragraph, the Commission has set off the total
confidence, reliance and dependence of the public investor and the totally "independent management" of the contr6leur.
The note of dependence is the element most expressive of
the true status of one who reposes confidence in another. A dependent person is subject to, in the power
of, another. This dependence is coterminous with the
orbit of reliance or confidence. The dependence in the
one finds the correlative independence in the other. It is
a "relation of inequality."
No more ultimate constituent of the [custodial concept of corporate control] lies beyond or beneath this
dependence. 96
The Leach Group and later the successor Kaiser Group-through
ISI-have "performed all essential management functions for the
Trust Fund." 9 7 The concept of the 'submission to direction' was
stressed: "[T]hose who are persuaded to buy investment company securities presumably do so on the assurance that their invested funds will be under the supervision and direction of a
professional and expert management.'"'98
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 202.
Brief, supra note 30, at 16.
Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO. L.J. 543, 557 (1965).
Brief, supra note 30, at 16.
Id. at 49-50.
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Regularly the Commission recurred to the innocent readiness of the public to entrust its money to others:
Investors who invested their money in the Trust Fund
did not put their faith in an abstract corporate entity but
in professional managers and in the expert direction
they had undertaken to furnish to the investors. 9 9
Here reiterated are all the ingredients of the confidence/reliance/dependence, the sole foundation of the custodial concept of corporate control. Here the public investors handed over
their money to "professional managers" and "put their faith" in
the unfettered and "expert direction they had undertaken to furnish." To "put their faith" in Leach and Kaiser was to repose in
them the fullest confidence in the management of their money.
Thus their reliance was complete. Since these powerless investors
had no control whatsoever over their $215 million, their dependence was patently total.
At another point, the Commission adverted consciously to
the all-important reliance:
[I]nvestors who bought securities of investment companies generally had been persuaded to rely on the vaunted
skill and experience of the sponsor and his associates
10o

Correlatively, the Commission emphasized the voluntary undertaking by the custodian:
[T]he investment advisor and principal underwriter each
occupies a fiduciary office in respect [to] the investment
company; . . . his contractual agreement with the company constitutes an undertaking of a fiduciary
character. ' o
Often the Brief stressed the willing assumption of the duty:
" 'Here you have a situation where a person assumes a fiduciary
obligation; he is the manager of other people's money.' "102 And
again: "[T]he investment advisor, having undertaken to discharge the company's commitments to its investors, necessarily
assumes a role that is managerial in function as well as in
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 44.
102. Id. at 44 (quoting Senate Hemings, supra note 1, at 253 (statement of
David Schenker)).
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obligation." 103
The Resultant Fiduciary Duty
The inexorable consequent-perhaps even corollary-of this
total confidence/reliance/dependenceis the total fiduciary responsibility engendered in the independent contr6leur who advertently
and freely undertakes "the expert direction" and " 'management
of other people's money.' "104 This conscious assumption of custody was repeated, emphasized by the Commission: The Leach
and Kaiser Groups had voluntarily "undertaken to furnish to the
investors"' 10 5 "vaunted" "expert direction," and had held themselves out as "professional managers."
The essence of custody is the confidence-reliance-dependence carried to the maximum in the formal appropriation of the asset to the trustee.
Beginning with this dependence, therefore, the reasoning moves one uncontroverted step forward to the el06
emental conclusion: Dependence begets responsibility.1
This total dependence on the one side and total independence on
the other led the Commission to the logical conclusion: In no
way could Leach or Kaiser and their respective minions-or any
contr6leurs of other people's money-"escape from their self-assumed fiduciary obligations to the Trust Fund and its
07
investors."1
Because this dependence is total in the complete appropriation of the fund-a total tenure tantamount to title
plus acquiescence in the stewardship status-the resultant responsibility is total.' 0 8
From this the Commission moves logically to the culminating
conclusion that the fiduciary duty of corporate control flows indisputably from this total dependence: The Leach and Kaiser
Groups-through ISI--"clearly stood in a fiduciary relationship
to the Trust Fund."'' 0°
In its conscious recognition of this total depen103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 23, 45.
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
Bayne, supra note 96, at 564.
Brief, supra note 30, at 23.
Bayne, supra note 96, at 565.
Brief, supra note 30, at 16.
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dence/independence with the resultant fiducial obligations, the
Commission had established the ultimate principle of its control
philosophy. This principle is a perfectly exponible proposition
and alone would lead the Commission willy-nilly to a cohesive
philosophy embodying all the consequent subprinciples and corollaries. With this the Commission had laid the foundation for
the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control: 110
At the base of the entire philosophy of corporate
control lies this concept of custody. The ownership, in
whatever form it may be organized, entrusts the corporate entity-either voluntarily or not-into the care and
stewardship of the contr6leur. This act of appropriation
effects a complete separation of ownership from control
and results in the absolute dominion of the office of contr6leur over the totality of corporate assets. The contr6leur thus becomes the ultimate, top-level power in the
corporate hierarchy. I
"Since the scope of [the contr6leur's] responsibility is coterminous with the extent of the custody, it follows that the responsibility of [the contr61eur] is total because [the totality of the public
112
investment] has been entrusted to [the contr6leur]."
Strict Trust
As early as the 1940 SEC Report, the Commission had concluded that the confidence/reliance/dependence of total custody
led necessarily to the age-old strictures of the law of strict trust.
The Report sought support from Moulton v. Field,' 13 a prototypal
strict-trust case: "IT]he courts have held that the holder of a
management contract with a corporation occupies a position of
trust. .. .- "4 Two years later, in the 1942 Opinion of the Commission's General Counsel, the Commission reiterated its position and equated the role of a corporate director with that of a
trustee:
In my opinion the legal status of an investment adviser is
1 10. First propounded in Bayne, A Philosophy of Coyporate Control, 112 U. PA.
22 (1963) [hereinafter Bayne, .4 Philosophy], and Bayne, supra note 96.
111. Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The WI'eyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case
Study, 18 STAN. L. REV. 438, 442 (1966).
112. Bayne, A Philosophy, supra note 110, at 33.
113. 179 F. 673 (7th Cir. 1910).
114. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1090 n.62.
L.

REV.
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similar to that of a trustee of a trust or a director or officer of a corporation, and the investment adviser is
under the same [obligations].' 15
Note well that the equitable rigors of strict-trust law were consciously embodied by the Congress in the 1940 Act by frequent
references to liability for "gross abuse of trust."' 1 16
By 1957, the Commission position was further crystallized.
The Brief refers to "the fundamental principle that management
controls and prerogatives are powers in trust""17 and to "the historic trust obligations prescribed by courts of equity."'18 Over
some dozen pages, the Brief has resort to a long line of wellknown strict-trust cases beginning with Sugden v. Crossland,1 19 in
1856 through McClure v. Law, 120 Moulton v. Field,12 1 Porter v.
Healy, 12 2 and on down to the fifties. Thus: "Trustees of corporations owe duties to others besides themselves; they have been
placed in a position of trust by the stockholders, and to those
stockholders they must be faithful."' 2 3 Later the Commission
singles out strict-trust terminology from the famous Perlman v.
Feldmann decision, referring to " 'the necessary undivided loyalty
owed by the fiduciary to his principal.' "124
Nor was the Commission unmindful that the Congress had
incorporated these rigorous trust strictures into the Act:
Since the Congress could not in detail proscribe every
means or device by which a faithless fiduciary might exploit his position of trust for his own account and benefit, the broad and inclusive provisions of Section 36 and
the equitable principles embodied therein are of central
importance in the enforcement of fiduciary standards.125
115. Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, Investment Company Act Release No. 40-354, [1941-1944 Dec.] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep.
75,281, at 75,698 (May 11, 1942).
116. Id.
117. Brief, supra note 30, at 36.
118. Id. at 78.
119. 3 Sma. & Giff. 192, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C. 1856).
120. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
121. 179 F. 673 (7th Cir. 1910).
122. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
123. Brief, supra note 30, at 58 (quoting Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98,

100 (1880)).
124. Id. at 20 (quoting Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.

1955)).
125. Id. at 18.
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The Benefit to Beneficiary Rule 1

6

"The first of the two major trust concepts [that is, custody] is
the cause of the second: All benefit from the administration of
27
the trust must redound to the beneficiary":1
ISI clearly stood in a fiduciary relationship to the Trust
Fund . . . . As such, ISI and its directors and officers
were under an affirmative duty to exercise their fiduciary
responsibilities for the benefit of the Trust Fund and its
public investors. Neither ISI nor its directors and officers could exploit their position for their personal
gain. 128
Later, the Commission confirms the rule:
Under equitable principles "the responsibility of the fiduciary is not limited to a proper regard for the tangible
balance sheet assets of the corporation, but includes the
dedication of his uncorrupted business judgment for the
sole benefit of the corporation ....,129
In most recent years, even modern courts have continued to
apply the doctrine of strict trust to a limited area of cases. The
so-called 'corporate opportunity' rule is nothing other than strict
trust applied to a somewhat narrow area of the law.' 30 The Commission conjoins the terminology of 'corporate opportunity' to
that of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule, in its interdict issued to
Leach, Kaiser et aliis:
[T]hose in control of ISI could not appropriate [any cor126.
127.
128.
129.

Bayne, supra note 96, at 563.
D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 53.
Brief, supra note 30, at 16.
Id. at 20 (quoting Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.

1955)).
130. The doctrine of corporate opportunity is not new to our law. It is
only one phase of the cardinal rule that requires undivided loyalty from
corporate fiduciaries ...
Directors and officers of a corporation are fiduciaries. They are
the trustees of its business and property. In this capacity, they are subject to the general rule of trusts and trustees ....
Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 11 111. App. 3d 766, 773-74, 297 N.E.2d 699, 70405 (1973), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds in part, 58 Ill.
2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 39
(1974); see also Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976); Abbott Redmont
Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973); Holden v. Construction
Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 358 (Iowa 1972); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207,
222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
Most 'corporate opportunity' cases have ultimate recourse to the classic
case, Guth v. Loft, Inc. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
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porate] opportunity for themselves, but, as fiduciaries,
must exercise it for the benefit of the investors in the
13
Trust Fund. '
In simple English, the public investors of the Trust Fund
would have deeply enjoyed the opportunity to net $4.37 million
for the transfer of the management of their $215 million in assets.
As authority for this 'corporate opportunity' corollary of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule, the Commission cited the oft quoted
strict-trust case, Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, "holding that [the] directors, as fiduciaries, may not intercept or appropriate for their
own account a transaction which should be available for the benefit of the corporation."'' 32 The Commission concluded this 'corporate opportunity' discussion with reference to Perlman v.
Feldmann:133 "The appropriation of that advantage for their own
account did 'not betoken the necessary undivided loyalty owed by
the fiduciary to his principal.' 134 Toward the end of the Brief
the Commission again imposes on Leach and Kaiser the mandates
of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule: "Its services are essentially of a
fiduciary character, and, as trustee, ISI may continue to render
these services . . . only for the purpose of discharging its obliga1 35
tions to the Trust Fund, and for no other."
B.

The Suitability of the Successor Contrdleur

Moreover, the contr6leur's broad fiduciary duty can
be broken down into three component obligations:
(1) establishing the best possible corporate structure,
(2) maintaining the most enlightened managerial policy,
36
and (3) selecting the most competent personnel.1
"Among the multitude of duties stemming from the broad
fiduciary obligation," and the corollary benefit-to-beneficiary
rule, "possibly the most important (and from the standpoint of
the study of control the most prolific of insight) is the contr6leur's final obligation: to appoint his successor. However im131. Brief, supra note 30, at 49.
132. Id. at 49 n.34 (citing Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935)).
133. 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
134. Brief, supra note 30, at 49 (quoting Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955)).
135. Id. at 96.
136. Bayne, supra note 111, at 443.
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portant may be his day-to-day and year-to-year performance, his
last official act can well shape the entire future of the
37
corporation."
From the aspect of either contr6leur or successor, therefore, the rule is clear: The benefit to beneficiary, and the
suitability of the appointee are the only legitimate considerations at the time of the appointment. Suitability is
the sole final cause that may flow legitimately into the
l3 8
selection of the new contr6leur.
The Commission was fully cognizant of these elemental concepts
and knew, moreover, that the sale of control was simply the appointment of a successor contr6leur for a price. "What is sold is
the occupancy [of the office], and the price paid for'the occupancy
39
is the premium-bribe."'
The Commission again used Moulton v. Field, one of the leading strict-trust sale-of-control cases. Thus the Commission's
Brief:
If the succession [to control] was worth $125,000 in the
market, the sale (if it were lawful) should have been
made by the directors for the benefit of the owners of the
business, not of Gray. For Gray had nothing legally saleable ....
So the arrangement ... by which the office...
and . . . control were sold . . . and the consideration
turned over to Gray instead of into the treasury, was a
40
betrayal of trust.'
And again, with resort to the equally famous Porter v. Healy, 14 1 the
Brief stressed that considerations of dollars rather than considerations of successor suitability rendered the contract a nullity and
resulted in premium-bribery rather than a legitimate appointment
of a new contr6leur.
Courts of equity have enforced the same principle
[that the contract was void as against public policy] when
137. Id.; see also Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 583,
591-92 (1965).
138. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX. L.
REV.

215, 221 (1969).
139. Bayne, The Sale-of-ControlPremium: The Definition, 53

MINN.

L. REV. 485,

494 (1969).
140. Brief, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting Moulton v. Field, 179 F. 673, 675
(7th Cir. 1910)).
141. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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the fiduciary or corporate office has been sold as part of
a package which formally appeared as a sale of stock control ....

Directors or officers have been held liable for

breach of trust when, upon the evidence, it appeared
that the excess "was not so much a part of the price paid
for the stock owned or controlled by the defendants as a
secret consideration paid to them for the purpose of
gaining immediate control of the organization of their
42
corporation." 1

Against this background, the Commission specifically interdicted the ISI sale of control:
In substance, the Commission views the transaction as
only nominally a sale of stock. The unique and substantial "asset", for which the purchasers paid about
$4,000,000, is the succession to ISI's contractual and fiduciary arrangements with the Trust Fund, which ISI
and the directors-defendants cannot sell either directly
14
or in the guise of a premium on ISI stock. 3
The Commission at this early stage in the legal history of the
development of a philosophy of corporate control-in the fifties,
impressive prescience in
commentary was sparseI44 -showed
to the benefit-toof
the
successor'
'appointment
conjoining the
beneficiary rule:
[T]he privilege of choosing a successor adviser or underwriter rests with the Trust Fund and its investors ...
[T]hose in control of ISI ... must exercise it for the ben-

14 5
efit of the investors in the Trust Fund.

Conflict of Interest
The Commission was demonstrably conscious that a conflict
of interest was invariably present when the incumbent contr6leur-say the Leach Group-negotiated the appointment of a
successor contr6leur-say the Kaiser Group-based on the
142. Brief, supra note 30, at 61 (quoting Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 432,
91 A. 428, 430 (1914)).
143. Id. at 45.
144. The Commission cited only three commentaries: Hill, The Sale of ConHARV. L. REV. 986 (1957);Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control,
REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactionsin Cotporate Control, 104 U. PA. L.

trolling Shares, 70

44

CALIF.
REV. 725

L.

(1956). Brief, supra note 30, at 61.
145. Brief, supra note 30, at 49.
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amount of premium-bribe dollars rather than on the successor's
suitability to manage the helpless assets-say $215 million-of
the helpless public investors. The Commission knew that a conflict of interest was intrinsic to the breach of loyalty which lay at
the heart of a trustee's 'trafficking in the trust.' Consistently
throughout the Brief, the Commission recurred to this conflict of
interest. Thus, in an excerpt from the 1938-1940 SEC Report:
The shift in control was a private negotiation between
the acquiring corporation . . .and the retiring management ....
Such shifts in control were usually advantageous to
the retiring managers. Consequently, minority stockholders of these companies were represented in the shift
of control . . .only by sponsors and managers who may
have been pecuniarily interested ....146
Midway in the Brief, the logical progression from breach of fiduciary duty to conflict of interest became even more patent:
There is no need to dilate upon the evils and abuses
involved in these practices [of trafficking in the trust]. It
is elementary that such practices are wholly at variance
with the fundamental principle that management controls and prerogatives are powers in trust, and as such
are not to be bought and sold in the market place as the
personal effects of the individual managers. It is also evident that trading in fiduciary relationships necessarily
involves conflicts of interest which are not likely to be
47
resolved in favor of the beneficiaries. 1
At this point resort to another, lesser-known strict-trust case,
Kratzer v. Day, 1 48 will add to one's understanding of the SEC position on sale-of-control conflict of interest. The Commission had
resort to Kratzer in its excoriation of the Milton/Odlum/Groves
trio: "A fiduciary may not place himself in a position where he
may be tempted to favor his own undisclosed interest at the ex149
pense of those who have placed their trust in him."'
Thus, the Commission throughout the Brief has shown its
146. Id. at 32-33 (quoting from Report, supra note 33, at 1029-30).
147. Id. at 36.
148. 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926).
149. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1092 n.69 (citing Carlisle v. Smith, 234 F.
759 (D. Ga. 1916); Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1924); Kratzer v. Day,
12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926)).
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dedication to "two controlling truths: The Conflict-of-Interest
Rule (1) is ultimately dictated by custodial tenure and (2) is a subrule derived directly from the basic loyalty of the benefit-to-beneficiary principle. It is essentially and inevitably related to these
1 50
first two major trust concepts."
C.

The Premium-Bribe

As early as 1940, the Commission had evolved a general understanding of the nature of the premium-bribe. True, there
were inconcinnities in the exposition, but except for an occasional
frailty the Commission could claim a solid appreciation of the
concept. Indeed, it is intriguing to watch the Commission shade
the various nuances of the definition as it developed its four-year
Study, culminating in the 1940 SEC Report. Using the foundation of this Report, the Commission was able to erect a convincing definition of the premium-bribe in its ISI Brief.
The redoubtable David Schenker, chief counsel for the
Study, recounted in his Senate testimony-toward the drafting of
the Investment Company Act of 1940-a vivid tale of a characteristic approach to the barter of the office. Here the public investor
held senior, nonvoting securities.
In the early part of 1938 .... a person . . .came to me
and said, "I am going to sell control of this investment
trust to Mr. So-and-so."
You would think ...that he owned that investment
trust. What he had was some of this tricky management
stock .... The fact of the matter is his stock had absolutely no asset value and all of the assets really belonged
to the senior security holders. Yet he was going to sell
the trust.
He said, "Well, we are going to get $2,000,000,"
which was a $2,000,000 premium on the stock, Senator,
... his stock was worth nothing, you see."
•.. "Anybody who will pay you... two million dollars for stock that is under water 50 dollars a share must
have some fancy ideas. ..."
He said, "He is going to buy the control block of
stock. Simultaneously I am going to turn over the board
150. D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 73.
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of directors to him." 1 5 1
But some preparatory commentary is necessary to point up
the Commission's success in penetrating this elusive concept, and
help chart the Commission's path.
The Premium in Perspective
A major source of misconception has been the failure to lay bare the mechanics of the sale of control and
the place of the premium-bribe. . . . [B]egin with two
basic premises: (1) Every transfer of control, of
whatever kind, is very simply the appointment of a new
person to the office of contr6leur. For some reason the
incumbent is leaving. He finds a willing successor. Control has been transferred. (2) Every transfer of control is
not a sale of control, but every sale is a transfer. The
'sale' is a limited species of the genus 'transfer'-the sale
is a transfer for a price. The sale, in effect, adds only one
new element-the premium paid for the appointment.
Never does a nonsale transfer directly involve money
52
passing from appointee to contr6leur.1
Notably, the Commission had grasped this focal point: The sale
of control "is very simply the appointment of a new person to the
office of contr6leur." Thus the Brief:
Neither ISI nor its management could dispose of ISI's
fiduciary arrangements with the Trust Fund, and the selection of a successor rested exclusively with the Trust
Fund and its investors under Section 15. To the extent
that a purchaser was willing to pay a substantial sum for
the privilege of succeeding to the contracts, those in
control of ISI and in a strategic position to dictate or influence the course of the succession could not appropri53
ate that opportunity for their own benefit.'
It would be best to consider the Commission's understanding
of the premium-bribe concept in the background of a more formal statement of the technical definition of the premium-bribe:
Broken down into its five principal parts, the sale-of151. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 54.
152. Bayne, supra note 139, at 493.
153. Brief, supra note 30, at 19-20.
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control premium-bribe can thus be technically defined as
(1) some form of consideration, monetary or otherwise,
(2) flowing to the incumbent contr6leur, (3) from or on
behalf of the prospective contr6leur, (4) to induce the
appointment to the office of control, (5) paid knowingly,
scienter. 154
Toward the formal enunciation of the Commission's definition of the premium-bribe, the four principal elements-the fifth,
scienter, goes without saying since even the most pedestrian premium-briber usually knows what he is doing, or should-will be
assembled one by one in logical order, through appropriate resort to the major Commission documents.
"Some Form of Consideration"
Among the knottier problems in the detection of a premiumbribe has been the isolation of "some form of consideration,
monetary or otherwise." Generally the parties to a sale of control
try to hide the premium-bribe dollars in a concomitant stock
sale.' 55 Even the competent Judge Swan, dissenting in the important sale-of-control Perlman v. Feldmann, stumbled over this isolation problem:
The controlling block could not by any possibility be
shorn of its appurtenant power to elect directors and
through them to control distribution of the corporate
product. It is this "appurtenant power" which gives a
controlling block its value as such block. What evidence
could be adduced to show the value of the block "if
shorn" of such appurtenant power, I cannot conceive,
for it cannot be shorn of it.156
154. Bayne, supra note 139, at 497.
155. The Brief alluded to the situation where no such difficult isolation
would be needed, as rare as such a case might be.
When the transaction involves the sale of the office or the management contract alone, unaccompanied by a sale of stock, these complexities are not present. Then the very act of sale constitutes the breach of
trust and the purchase price itself is the measure of the fiduciary's
liability.
Brief, supra note 30, at 65. The Commission instanced Sugden v. Crossland, 3
Sma. & Giff. 192, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C. 1856), and Moulton v. Field, 179 F.
673 (7th Cir. 1910), as examples in which no isolation was required since the
consideration stood alone.
156. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir.) (Swan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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But the Commission, showing much more prescience than Judge
Swan, could "conceive," correctly, how "the value of the block"
could be "shorn" from the element of control. The ISI Brief is a
valuable lesson to any court, as well as a forceful statement by the
Commission:
In the Commission's view, the transactions in the instant case were much more than a sale of stock . . . .
[S]tock control of ISI was sold by its directors, officers
and majority stockholders at $50 per share although the
net asset value of the stock was below $2 per share. It is
further alleged that the price paid did "not represent the
real and actual value" of the ISI shares and that it "represented no payment for any asset or assets" owned by
ISI. The unique and substantial "asset" for which the
purchasers paid about $4,000,000, was the opportunity
to succeed to ISI's contractual and fiduciary arrangements with the Trust Fund .... 157
That was in 1956, but two decades earlier in the four-year
study released in the 1938-1940 SEC Report the Commission had
already segregated the 'consideration' requisite of the definition
of the premium-bribe: (The Commission was speaking of the sale
of control of an investment trust by the investment advisers as an
alternative to a dissolution which would have resulted in the more
equitable distribution of the fund's assets to the owners, the senior security holders.)
Sponsors and managers... would have received nothing
in the event of a dissolution. The alternative of selling
their common stock, worthless in asset value but valuable as controlling the corporate assets belonging to se58
nior security holders, was obviously more attractive.
At another point in the Brief, the Commission gathered support for its isolation of the 'consideration' factor of the premiumbribe by several-five in all-factual illustrations culled from various parts of the 1938-1940 SEC Report:
Several techniques were employed in the sale of
management control. In some cases, compensation was
paid for the direct assignment of the contract. In other
157. Brief, supra note 30, at 19.

158. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1023.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss1/2

38

Bayne: The S.E.C. and the Sale of Control: Ambivalence, Vacillation or P

1988]

THE SALE OF CONTROL

cases, payment for the assignment was reflected in the
premium paid in the purchase of blocks of the investment company's capital stock held by the management.
In still others, when the manager or sponsor was a corporation, rather than a partnership or a sole proprietor,
control of the contract was obtained by purchasing the
stock of the management or service company at a substantial price, although the stock had little or no asset
value apart from the contract and the incidents of con59
trol that went with it.'
Patently a premium-bribe can hide behind many guises and pass
in an infinite variety of ways.
Repeatedly throughout the 1938-1940 SEC Report and the
years of testimony, the Commission spotlighted the element of
consideration: "[T]he acquiring . . . individual purchased from
those in control their common stocks with negative asset value at
prices far in excess of their nominal market value."' 160 And, as
was commonplace: "[The] acquisition ... encompassed ... the
purchase of the shares . . . held by the public at prices less than
,"161
the asset value of such shares .
The sale-of-control history has uncovered only two looting
cases-cases in which the premium-bribers first bought control
and then looted the controlled company-the Reynolds I62 cases
and InsuransharesCorp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.163 The Commission
relied on both cases at various points in the ISI argumentation,
but Insuransharesoffers a particularly impressive expression of the
difference between honest investment value of an accompanying
block of stock and the dollar value of the premium-bribe which,
perhaps fortuitously, happened to accompany the stock sale. The
Brief quotes the court, appositely:
The defendants have insisted throughout the case
that the transfer of December 21, 1937, was simply a sale
of stock, the passing of control being merely a normal
159. Brief, supra note 30, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).

160.

REPORT,

supra note 11, at 1086.

161. Id. at 1024.
162. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668
(Sup. Ct. 1941); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (1960).
163. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa.
1941).
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concomitant, and most of their argument was based
upon this premise. This view, however, I think is fundamentally wrong. If the whole record be read, I do not
see how the transaction can be considered as anything
other than a sale of control, to which the stock sale was
requisite, but nevertheless a secondary matter. ... The
buyers were primarily interested in getting control of the
corporation together with such stock ownership as
would make that control secure and untrammelled, and
the sellers were primarily interested in getting as much
money as possible for what they had to sell-both the
16 4
control and their interest in the assets.
Thus the Commission has successfully segregated unexplained dollars-dollars, that is, that cannot be accounted for legitimately, say as gift or debt-which can be explained only as
"some form of consideration, monetary or otherwise." Which
leads to the second of four requisites of the Commission's definition of the premium-bribe.
"Flowing to the Incumbent Contr6leur"
In the main, the Commission assumed that the destination of
the premium-bribe dollars was the outgoing contr6leur. Thus, in
Insuranshares, the Commission saw no need to highlight the fact
that the incumbent received the premium-bribe, and stated simply that " 'the sellers were primarily interested in getting as much
money as possible for what they had to sell-both the control and
their interest in the assets.' ",165
But at times there did seem to be Commission emphasisalbeit not overwhelming-on this second essential element to the
premium-bribe. After all, if the incumbent contr6leur did not receive the "consideration, monetary or otherwise," a premiumbribe could scarce be attributed to anyone. The 1938-1940 SEC
Report was sufficiently explicit:
The common method of acquiring control of a company is the purchase of the controlling blocks of stock
held by the company's . . . "insiders" at a price representing a substantial premium over the market value ....
164. Brief, supra note 30, at 47-48 (quoting Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
165. Id. at 48 (quoting Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
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In nearly all . . . cases the price was substantially in, excess of the consideration ...paid ... to minority holders
...in the course of a program to absorb eventually the
66
assets of the acquired company.
Restrained understatement nonetheless left no doubt that the
premium-bribe dollars must find their way to the pockets of "the
vendors of control," or no premium-bribe. From the results of
the four-year Study in the 1938-1940 SEC Report:
In other cases, however, the shifts in control and the
amalgamation of investment companies were inspired by
motives of pecuniary gain to the vendors of control
which were not necessarily consonant with the interest of
16 7
the public investors.
Next came the third, patent but essential, element of the premium-bribe.
"From or on Behalf of the Prospective Contr6leur"
These various requisites of a premium-bribe may seem palpably self-evident, but the Commission-and any sale-of-control
scholar-knows that every element is essential to any arguable liability for premium-bribery, self-evident or no. The Brief is typically assertive:
It is also incontestable doctrine that a fiduciary, while he
may resign at will, may not accept payment from one
who wishes to succeed to his position .... 168
And in the same vein at an earlier point in the Brief:
To the extent that a purchaser was willing to pay a substantial sum for the privilege of succeeding to the contracts, those in control of ISI and in a strategic position
to dictate or influence the course of the succession could
not appropriate that opportunity for their own
benefit.'16 9
Again, the Brief has resort to the Second Circuit Feldmann:
[T]he receipt of substantial payments for the succession
166. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1092-93.
167. Id. at 1019.
168. Brief, supra note 30, at 20.
169. Id.
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in this case is inconsistent with the necessary undivided
0
loyalty [owed] by the fiduciary to his principal.17
In New York, Benson v. Braun 17 '-a lesser sale-of-control
case-the Commission used the court to elaborate somewhat on
this third requisite of premium-bribery:
[F]iduciaries had sold control by the sale of stock at a
price far in excess of its fair value "on the theory that the
said excess was paid for the resignations, for the election
of the purchasers' nominees, and for immediate control
72
of the corporation." 1
The Commission's Brief also attempted to impute to the Congress the intent to proscribe the payment of premium-bribe dollars by the would-be contr6leur.
Since Congress declared that these fiduciary offices were
not objects of sale and that aspirants to such offices were
subject to election, payment to the present management
or those in control for the succession is forbidden under
equitable doctrines which courts of equity have enforced
for at least one hundred years .... 173
"To Induce the Appointment to the Office of Control"
The last of four essentials-recall that the fifth, scienter, requires no present analysis-is the most important. Grant that
(1) "the consideration, monetary or otherwise" has already
passed (2) "to the incumbent contr6leur" and (3) has been
proven to have been passed by "the prospective contr6leur," nevertheless, unless (4) the purpose of that payment is to induce the
appointment to control, any alleged liability for the tort of premium-bribery 174 will clearly fail. All four-as well as scienter170. Id. (quoting Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
171. 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
172. Brief, supra note 30, at 48 (quoting Benson v. Braun, 286 A.D. 1098,
1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (1955)).
173. Id. at 76.
174. Some jurisdictions also provide criminal sanctions for commercial
bribery. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-I 1-120, -121 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.660,
.670 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2605 (Supp. 1987); COLO. REX'. STAT.
§ 18-5-401 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-160, -161 (1985); HAWAII REX'.
STAT. § 708-880 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
29A-1, -2 (1985); IOWA CODE
§ 722.10 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.020, .030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73 (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 271,
§ 39 (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.125 (1979); MINN. STAT. § 609.86
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are absolutely essential, but the purpose to induce is preeminent.
The Commission's resort in its Brief to Insuransharesis possibly the clearest exposition of this fourth and final element of the
definition of the premium-bribe:
"If the whole record be read, I do not see how the transaction can be considered as anything other than a sale of
control, to which the stock sale was requisite, but nevertheless a secondary matter . . . The buyers were primarily interested in getting control of the corporation
together with such stock ownership as would make that
control secure and untrammelled, and the sellers were
primarily interested in getting as much money as possible for what they had to sell-both the control and their
' 75
interest in the assets."'
The same point was equally explicit in resort to Benson v. Braun:
[F]iduciaries had sold control by the sale of stock at a
price far in excess of its fair value on the theory that the
said excess was paid for the resignations, for the election
of the purchasers' nominees, and for immediate control
76
of the corporation.1
The Schenker testimony in the 1940 Senate Hearings, which led
to the Investment Company Act of 1940, gave a cameo picture of
the requisite 'to induce the appointment':
In the early part of 1938 . . . a person who controls an
investment trust came to me and said, "I am going to sell
control of this investment trust to Mr. So-and-so."
He said, "he is going to buy the control block of
stock. Simultaneously I am going to turn over the board
(1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-11-11, -13 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 570.150
(1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-613 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.295 (1957);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:7 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (West 1982);
N.Y. PENAL LAW. §§ 180.00, .05 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-353
(1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-12-08 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4108
(Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-7-3, -4 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17540 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-43-1, -2 (Supp. 1987);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-508
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-444 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.060,
.070 (1962); Wis. STAT. § 134.05 (1981-82).
175. Brief, supra note 30, at 47-48 (quoting Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
176. Id. at 48 (citing Benson v. Braun, 286 A.D. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711

(1955)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 49

of directors to him. He then expects to liquidate the
blue-chip portfolio, pay me for the control block
"177

With this, the Commission has laid out all the essentials of a
premium-bribe. But the questions now arise: So what? Is a premium-bribe so blameworthy? Are not premium-bribes a fact of
daily life?
D.

The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe

One of the ironies in the history of legal thought is the regularly recurrent inability of even the sophisticated legal mind to
apply age-old tried-and-true moral concepts to novel and complicated factual situations. A complex variant of a primitive swindle
can often elude even a competent judiciary. So has it been with
the illegitimacy of the sale of control. In the halcyon years of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, however, particularly during the second
half of the 1800's, the courts of England-and by inheritance the
courts in the United States-elaborated a refined body of sale-ofcontrol law. Granted, the factual contexts were abecedarian.
Nonetheless, the Anglo-American jurists came to grips with the
problem of commercial premium-bribery with admirable
finesse. 178
The research work of Messrs. Meeker and Levy and their staff
on the ISI Brief uncovered this refined body of sale-of-control law
and presented to the courts and commentators a convincing line
of cases, all of which pronounced premium-bribery inherently
79
impermissible. 1
The Brief began this historic line with the elemental Sugden v.
Crosslandin England in 1856. In Sugden, a trustee saw fit to accept
177. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 54.
178. For the principal, if not exhaustive, study of Anglo-American sale-ofcontrol litigation, opinions and commentary, see generally D. BAYNE, supra note
91, at 389 (inlcuding supplementary tables).
179. A notable instance of the use of this line-conjecturally readily referable to the Commission's research-appeared in Judge Friendly's masterful Rosenfeld v. Black, undoubtedly the most significant sale-of-control opinion thus far.
We start from one of the "well-established principles of equity."
recognized in Insurance Securities itself, ....that a personal trustee, corporate officer or director, or other person standing in a fiduciary relationship with another, may not sell or transfer such office for personal
gain." There are ample authorities to support this proposition:
Sugden v. Crossland, ...
McClure v. Law, ... ; Porter v. Heal,.
Kratzer v. Day ....
445 F.2d 1337, 1342 (2d Cir. 1971). Only those cases uncovered by the SEC
Brief were retained in this excerpt from Rosenfeld.
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£75 under the table to secure his resignation and the appointment of a successor to his position. The Vice-Chancellor reprobated this premium-bribery:
Horsfield abandoned his duty and office as trustee for a
valuable consideration, and made over the trusteeship to
a person who was deliberately excluded from that office
by the testator. Such a transaction, as well as the instrument by which it was sought to be carried into effect, was
entirely unjustifiable, and the deed, in accordance with
the terms of the prayer, must be delivered up to be
cancelled.'18 0
Although the simplicity of Sugden-combined, of course, with
its condemnation of premium-bribery-recommended itself as
the bellwether case in the field, each of the succeeding cases offered the Commission a similar opportunity to expatiate on the
intrinsic illegitimacy. The Brief, therefore, proceeded to present
summaries and appropriate excerpts from each in the series: Following (1) Sugden came (2) McClure v. Law, 18 ' then (3) Moulton v.
184
Field,18 2 (4) Porterv. Healy, 1 83 and finally (5) Perlman v. Feldmann,
which was the most illustrious thus far.
Remember that the 20 years prior to the Commission's ISI
Brief, 1936 to 1956, had produced only rudimentary study and
commentary on the sale of control. This was especially true in the
recondite area of the intrinsic illegitimacy of the premium-bribe.
At this relatively early stage in the development of a philosophy
of corporate control, courts and commentators had not yet reasoned beyond the stage of a general realization that somehow, for
some valid but yet undefined reason, premium-bribery was inherently wrong and should not be tolerated.
Understandably, therefore, the Commission, albeit in the
vanguard, could do no more than reflect the most refined thinking of the time. Yet, as early as the 1938-1940 SEC Report, the
Commission had presented testimony, gathered over the four
years, that even then had been adduced to support the Commission's oft stated thesis that premium-bribery was essentially untenable. In the reams of such testimony, one of the more telling
180. Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sma. & Giff. 192, 193, 65 Eng. Rep. 620, 621
(V.C. 1856).
181. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
182. 179 F. 673 (7th Cir. 1910),
183. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
184. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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excoriations of premium-bribery was elicited during the public
examination of the president of Interstate Equities Corporation.
The testimony was in specific "reference to the practice of using
the assets of acquired investment companies to purchase controlling blocks of the negative-asset-value common stocks of other
investment companies at prices in excess of the market value of
85
such stocks:"'
[A] minority . . . stock interest receives in practice no
benefit of the premium [for control].
In my own judgment, it is only a question of time
when . .. [the] theory of premium for control, will be
exposed to the merciless criticism of public investigation
186

Especially on the question of the basic illegality of premiumbribery, the Commission frequently interlarded the fact-gathering
of the thirties-which, of course, was the principal objective of the
four years of the Study-with dogmatic pronouncements supported by cases and commentaries. Here, more than elsewhere,
one could discern the philosophical outline that would later
emerge in the mid-fifties in the Commission's formal statements
of its philosophy of corporate control. In the 1938-1940 SEC Report, the Commission used early New York opinions to carry its
point:
[C]ontracts by which directors ... expressly agree as an
incident to the sale of their shares . . . to transfer the
offices and directorships . . ., that is, to "barter away" the
offices of the companies ... are illegal as against public
policy. 187

In the late thirties-and even today in the case of many courtsthe ultimate condemnation available to judge or writer was:
88
"[I]llegal as against public policy."'
185. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1038 n.42.
186. Id. (quoting a letter written by Edward R. Tinker, first president of
Interstate Equities Corp., July 27, 1932 (Public Examination, Interstate Equities
Corp., Commission's Exhibit No. 24)).
187. Id. at 1029 n.27 (citing Fennessy v. Ross, 90 Hun. 298, 35 N.Y.S. 868
(Sup. Ct. 1895), 5 A.D. 342, 39 N.Y.S. 323 (1896); comparing McClure v. Law,
161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899)).
188. The opinion that placed Iowa as the only state jurisdiction to proscribe civil premium-bribery could adduce no reason for the proscription beyond: -The transaction was thus contrary to public policy. We have long held
contracts contrary to public policy are unenforceable." Rowen v. Le Mars Mut.
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Twenty years later, in the SEC Brief, the avowed purpose was
no longer mere fact-finding but was rather the erection of a philosophy of corporate control, at least as applied to premium-bribery. Here, the Commission endeavored to flesh out the
unadorned, and evasive, concept, 'illegal on account of public
policy.' The Brief, understandably, sought to incorporate whenever possible the vast work of the 1936-1940 SEC Study:
Since Congress declared that these fiduciary offices were
not objects of sale and that aspirants to such offices were
subject to election, payment to the present management
or those in control for the succession is forbidden under
equitable doctrines which courts of equity have enforced
for at least one hundred years, and of which, we may be
sure, the Congress was aware when it enacted the broad
and inclusive provisions of Sections 15 and 36. These
equitable principles were discussed in the Commission's
report of investigation with specific reference to the
transfer of management contracts.'18 9
Later, the Brief recurred to the strict-trust foundation of premium-bribe illegality.
There is no need to dilate upon the evils and abuses
involved in these practices. It is elementary that such
practices are wholly at variance with the fundamental
principle that management controls and prerogatives are
powers in trust and as such are not to be bought and
sold in the market place as the personal effects of the
individual managers. It is also evident that trading in fiduciary relationships necessarily involves conflicts of interests which are not likely to be resolved in favor of the
beneficiaries. 19 0
In its quest for a more ultimate rationale for the illegality of the
premium-bribe, the Commission borrowed from Perlman v. FeldIns. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 650 (Iowa 1979). Anent this usage, the popular quotation from the early English court remains worthy of repetition:
I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly
upon public policy;-it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from
the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail.
Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 1824).
189. Brief, supra note 30, at 76 (referring to REPORT, supra note 11, at 1029,
1086).
190. Id. at 36.
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mann which had expounded the best reasons thus far for such
illegality:
Under equitable principles "the responsibility of the fiduciary is not limited to a proper regard for the tangible
balance sheet assets of the corporation, but includes the
dedication of his uncorrupted business judgment for the
sole benefit of the corporation, in any dealings which
may adversely affect it", and the receipt of substantial
payments for the succession in this case is inconsistent
with "the necessary undivided loyalty [owed] by the fiduciary to his principal."... It is also incontestable doctrine that a fiduciary, while he may resign at will, may not
accept payment from one who wishes to succeed to his
position ....191
The Commission, moreover, took pains to point out the radical difference between a legitimate transfer of control and a sale
of control for a premium-bribe:
It is when the sale of control involves receipt of consideration for the succession to these fiduciary offices that
in our view, the sale constitutes . . . "gross abuse of
trust" ....

192

The Court in the 1880 California case, Forbes v. McDonaldl 9 3 -prominent in the historic sale-of-control line-added a
fundamental explanation of the philosophical rationale of the illegitimacy by interdicting the sale of control as essentially 'against
good morals.' This may be thought to be no more fundamental
than 'illegal as against public policy,' but the Commission nonetheless thought that the approach added to an understanding of
the illegitimacy:
"It is contra bonos mores. Trustees of corporations owe duties to others besides themselves; they have been placed
in a position of trust by the stockholders, and to those
stockholders they must be faithful. It is a violation of
that trust for them to be bought out of office. They may
resign when they please, but they must not make profit
or benefit themselves in the matter of such
191. Id. at 20 (quoting Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.
1955)).
192. Id. at 69.
193. 54 Cal. 98 (1880).
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resignation."' 194
In a word, the Commission's research-spanning the 20
years 1936-1956-was superb. Not only did the Commission
construct an embryonic philosophy of the intrinsic illegitimacy of
the premium-bribe, but that philosophy was tenable, cohesive and
unvarying over the period.
In no wise is it in derogation of the Commission's work to
suggest that the ultimate rationale of this intrinsic illegitimacy lay
in the culminating statement of a lengthy 1969 study:
The totality of the turpitude of the premium-bribe
consists of three conceptually distinct elements caused
by separate breaches of fiduciary duty, each with its own
peculiar contribution and coalescing into a distinctive
moral unit. This tripartite illegitimacy could be defined
as:
(1) The perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contr5leur, engendered by an appointment of a successor induced
by a cause other than suitability, (2) That is, for consideration illicit in itself, (3) Resulting in the appointment of a
candidate unsuitable by reason of his own active role in the
inducement.
This technical definition states the major thesis [of the
95
rationale]. 1
Perhaps this aspect of this 'open letter' could serve the Commission for the future.
E.

The Triple Sanction: Disgorgement, Damages, Dismissal

In the light of the painstaking effort in constructing the long
line of Commission argumentation thus far elaborated, the Commission's emphasis on the consequent sanctions was almost perfunctory. The ISI complaint lumped them all in one summary
request. The Commission sought:
a permanent injunction to restrain the [Kaiser
Group] from serving as officers and directors of ISI and
from serving and acting as directors of the proposed
board of directors of the Trust Fund, and ISI from acting
as investment adviser and principal underwriter of the
194. Brief, supra note 30, at 58 (quoting Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98,
100 (1880)).
195. D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 204-05.
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Trust Fund; and an accounting for the monetary benefits
which the [Leach Group] wrongfully and inequitably obtained as a consequence of the sale of their ISI stock. I'
For purposes of clarity and ease of understanding, the Commission's sought-for sanctions will be explored in their three
divisions.
i.

Disgorgement

Whereas one might argue that the Commission did adduce a
convincing rationale for the intrinsic illegitimacy of the premiumbribe, on the question of the rightful ownership of those premium-bribe dollars-albeit ab initio illegitimate-once paid over
to the would-be contr6leur, the Commission proceeded little beyond mere assertion and allegation:
[T]he payment for stock control at $50 per share, as
against net asset value of $1.81 per share, represent[ing]
...an asset of the Trust Fund, equitably belongs to the
97
Trust Fund. 1
Beyond the assertion that this premium-bribe is "an asset of the
Trust Fund," the Commission makes little effort to establish the
reasons why the $4.37 million is a Trust Fund asset.
Perhaps this is harsh, because the Commission does make
good use of its historical line of sale-of-control cases in arguing
for the disgorgement of the $4.37 million by the Leach Group
over to the Trust Fund. Moreover, the Commission did elaborate
quite fully the sale-of-control arguments in its exposition of each
of these five principal cases:
(1) Sugden v. Crossland.I9 The Vice-Chancellor in 1856 in
England was acting in a case of first impression. His rationale was
virtually unexplained, 199 but his holding was unimpeachable:
[T]he trustee derived the profit.., from the [sale of the]
office itself. I shall therefore direct that the £75 be re196. Brief, supra note 30, at 13.
197. Id. at 12.
198. 3 Sma. & Giff. 192, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C. 1856).
199. This, again, could be harsh because the Vice-Chancellor correctly
analogizes "trust property" with "the office itself": "Though there is some peculiarity in the case, there does not seem to be any difference in principle
whether the trustee derived the profit by means of the trust property, or from
the office itself." Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sma. & Giff. 192, 194, 65 Eng. Rep.
620, 621 (V.C. 1856), quoted in Brief, supra note 30, at 57.
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paid by Horsfield and dealt with as part of the assets [of
2 °°
the trust].
The Commission's Brief placed considerable reliance, passim, on
Sugden, 20 and quoted Sugden at some length 20 2 in explanation of
the Vice-Chancellor's action "in directing the selling trustee to
account to the estate for the funds .... "203
(2) McClure v. Law. 20 4 The New York courts at the turn of
the century made a major contribution to the understanding of
the sale of control in general,2 0 5 and this contribution extended
to the specific question of the ultimate rationale for the disgorgement of the premium-bribe over to the corporate entity. The McClure court was the first to characterize the premium paid for
control "as a bribe." 20 6 More important, McClure moved the saleof-control philosophy from application to a pure trust-as was the
case with Sugden-to application to a business corporation. Further, the simplicity of a nonstock, nonshareholder entity permitted even the untrained mind to see through to the essentials of
sale-of-control premium-bribery.
The Commission used McClure to the hilt. Since the facts in
McClure were on all fours with Sugden, no deft fact-finding was required. The Brief concluded effortlessly to the sanction: Disgorgement to the entity, quoting McClure appositely:
[McClure] held that as president and director he was liable to the corporation
for all moneys that came into his hands by virtue of
his official acts ....
The election of directors, and
the transfer of the management and property of the
corporation, were official acts, and whatever money
he received from such official acts were moneys derived by virtue of his office, for which we think he
200. 3 Sma. & Giff. at 194, 65 Eng. Rep. at 621.
201. "The fiduciary principle [proscribing the "auction" of the "office" of
control] . . . was announced by Vice-Chancellor Sir John Stuart one hundred
years ago in Sugden v. Crossland." Brief, supra note 30, at 56.
202. Id. at 56-57.
203. Id. at 57.
204. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899), reversing, 20 A.D. 459, 47 N.Y.S. 84
(1897).
205. McClure was the most prominent New York litigation, but arguably
Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901), was equally prolific of saleof-control insights. See D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 163-71, 265-78; Bayne, The
Curse of Corporate Control. A Mutual Insurance Company, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227,
323-30.
206. 161 N.Y. 78, 80, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
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should account. 20 7
Here the Commission, using McClure, penetrated to the very
foundation for disgorgement to the entity, the illegality of the
consideration paid for control. This was one of the three essentials of the illegitimacy of the premium-bribe. Recall the tripartite
breakdown:
(1) The perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contrYleur,
engendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a cause
other than suitability, (2) That is, for consideration illicit in itself, (3) Resulting in the appointment of a candidate unsuitable
20
by reason of his own active role in the inducement.
But McClure-and hence the Commission-went deeper than the
mere statement of the illegality of the consideration, and thereby
proffered the correct explanation for disgorgement to the entity.
Superficial thinking will generally admit to the illegality, but not
carry the argumentation to an award to the entity, and thence to
the owners of the entity.
The nub of the reasoning lay in the fact that the selection and
appointment of a successor contr6leur-whether to a formal trust
as in Sugden, to a mutual insurance company as in McClure, or to a
mutual fund as in ISI--"were official acts, and whatever money he
received from such official acts were moneys derived by virtue of
his office, for which we think he should account." 20 9 This concept
can be stated more elaborately, but McClure210 and the Commission nonetheless had the basic idea.
In the premium-bribe the incumbent contr6leur accepted [monetary consideration] for a corporate act [the
appointment of a successor], the most important of his
corporate career, performed "in fulfillment of a corporate duty, in the course of official business, during the
regular workweek, for which he was already amply
remunerated."
207. Brief, supra note 30, at 59 (quoting McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81,
55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899)).
208. D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 204-05.
209. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
210. The Brief trod the same ground by using the other turn-of-century
New York sale-of-control case, Bosworth v. Allen, to the same point. 168 N.Y.
157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901). Thus, the outgoing contr6leurs were liable "even, as
we have recently held, for 'moneys derived by virtue of [their] office.' " Brief,
supra note 30, at 62 (quoting McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389
(1899)).
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... [T]he all-important emolument was paid by a
third party to a top-level executive as a corporate official
because of his official position and was pocketed personally, even though every minute of time and ounce of energy had been dedicated to the exclusive benefit of the
21
beneficiary shareholders. '
Immediately following the Brief's resort to McClure came the
comment that the "same principle was applied in Moulton v.
2 12
Field."
(3) Moulton v. Field.2 13 Roughly ten years later, the Seventh
Circuit, in 1910, brought the federal courts into the tradition.
The facts in Moulton v. Field were not complicated, hence the law
stood out clearly. The Brief selected the correct verbiage to
award the premium-bribe over to the corporation:
If the succession was worth $125,000 in the market, the
sale (if it were lawful) should have been made by the directors for the benefit of the owners of the business, not
of Gray. For Gray had nothing legally saleable. His contract, being for personal service, was not assignable; and
the resolution of the directors really created a new contract with Rosenfeld [the purchaser]. So the arrangement ... by which the office of general manager and the
proxy control were sold to Rosenfeld and the consideration turned over to Gray instead of into the treasury, was
2 14
a betrayal of trust.
Here is at least an intimation of the same rationale: The appointment of a successor contr6leur was a "personal service."
(4) Porter v. Healy. 2 15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
1914, provided the Brief with an easily understandable fact situation and a traditional holding:
[H]is official position is not his individual property in any
sense, and he has no right, either directly or indirectly,
to use it for his own selfish ends; . . . all money thus
made belongs either to the corporation, or . . . in common to its shareholders .... 216
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

D. BAYNE, SuPra note 91, at 220-2 1.
Brief, sitpra note 30, at 59.
179 F. 673 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 219 U.S. 586 (1911).
Brief, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting .lioultoit, 179 F. at 675).
244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
Id. at 437, 91 A. at 432.
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(5) Perlman v. Feldmann.2 17 With Feldmann, the progress
from a strict-trust Sugden through nonstock companies such as
McClure to closely held corporations, Moulton and Porter,
culminates with a widely held stock corporation. Feldmann has
been analyzed to shreds. 2 18 But it nonetheless served the Commission well in its argument for disgorgement. The Second Circuit, in 1955, on relatively simple facts, according to the Brief,
remanded the case to the district court for an accounting
of that portion of the excess of $12 per share which reflected the value attached to this managerial prerogative,
which, in the court's view, did not belong to the defend21 9
ants but to the corporation and its shareholders.
Although 'these five principal cases' were selected as worthy
of special note here, the Commission, in a brief of 112 pages, relied on other worthwhile opinions. But these five cover the essentials, and are particularly apropos to the disgorgement question.
This question could well be concluded by reviewing the full
20 years and reverting to the testimony of the forties, contained
in the 1940 Senate Hearings. Typical of so much of the testimony
are the earthy remarks of "Mr. Merrill Griswold, then and for
many years later, Chairman of the Board of Massachusetts Investors Trust, the largest of the open-end companies, referring to
2 20
the evils resulting from the sale of control:"
It has been suggested that the trustees might sell
out their office-in other words, that you could come to
me and offer me so much money, and that I would resign, and the other trustees would elect, we shall say, Mr.
DeRonde to take my place, and then another one of us
would resign and we would elect some other man; and in
that way we could sell out.
The answer to that is that it is absolutely impossible
for us to do that; because under the common law respecting fiduciaries, if we were crooked enough to do it,
the funds we would receive would themselves belong to
the company, and we could not keep them; and if we did
217. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
218. But one analysis of Feldmann was devoted exclusively to the question
under discussion, the triple sanction. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CAIFV. L. REV. 615 (1969).
219. Brief, snpra note 30, at 63.
220. Id. at 76.
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keep them, we would be guilty of an embezzlement. In
other words, we cannot "sell down the river" if we want
22 1
to-and we do not want to.

ii.

Damages

The apparently uncomplicated question of damages in the
sale of control has in fact been the source of considerable confusion. A preliminary distinction will clear the path for undistracted
concentration on the narrow area of damages.
Disgorgement and Damages
The Commission commendably made plain the palpable distinction between (1) the disgorgement of the premium-bribe to the
corporate entity and (2) the exaction of damages from the outgoing
contr6leur for later but foreseeable looting. Here are two totally
different wrongs, the former a breach of fiduciary duty founded in
strict trust, the latter a simple tort of conversion. No connection-other than common malefactors and victims-exists between the two.
Even in the fact-finding days of 1936-1940, the Commission
enunciated this disgorgement/damages dichotomy either through
examination of witnesses or in direct statements of the case law.
The succession of an unscrupulous management to
control of an investment company was almost immediately followed by a course of dealing between the new
management and the company which resulted in a waste
and conversion of the corporate assets to the advantage
and profit of the new management and to the damage
and loss of the public stockholders who were powerless
22 2
to prevent such activities.
With good insight, the Commission also pointed up a generally neglected presumption that the premium-bribe "was a prime
indicator of possible present and future wrongdoing, that such
wrongdoing was inevitably a human activity, and that the princi'- pal human involved was the incoming contr6leur.
Nevertheless, although the substantial prices paid to
221. Se ate Hearings. supra note 1, at 505.
222.

REPORT,

supra note 11, at 1024.

223. Bayne, The Sale-of-Coutrol Quaidapy, 51

CORNELL

L. RE'. 49, 70 (1965).
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retiring managements for their control should have
served to warn them of possible future activities of the
purchasers which might be detrimental to the interest of
the stockholders, few of the selling management exacted
any conditions to their sales which would operate to pro22 4
tect stockholders.
During the examinations of Gerald Beal, a banker who figured in
the Continental Securities sell-out (which later reached the courts
in the Reynolds cases 22 5), the Commission again stressed the foreseeability of later looting by a premium-briber:
Q Well, isn't this a fact, Mr. Beal, and I won't pursue
this any further, anybody who will pay you $20 a share
for stock which had... a minus $11 value ....
when he
gets control he can do one thing, that is put his hands on
the cash. That ... is the outrageous way, isn't it?226
At another point, the 1938-1940 SEC Report again recurred
to the expectable damages subsequent to the sale of control:
Usually, only a cursory investigation of the integrity, responsibility, and ability of the new management was
made by retiring managements who had been well compensated
for their
transfer
of control
and
2 27
management.
Predictably, the lessons learned in the thirties led the Commission to stress the danger of future looting in the ISI case. In
seeking a reversal of the lower court, the Brief cautioned the
Ninth Circuit:
Under the interpretation of the court below, the abuses
of the past may recur. Succession to these contracts may
once more be put on the auction block for sale to the
highest bidder for the benefit of management, and the
purchasers may be tempted to pursue hazardous or
doubtful policies in order to recoup as quickly as possible the substantial price they paid for stock control and
228
the succession to the agreements.
224. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1089.
225. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1941); Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
226. REPORT, supra note 11, at 1087.
227. Id. at 1022.
228. Brief, supra note 30, at 22.
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Later, the Brief stressed the same point:
The new management, forced to pay a substantial premium for control, might take the attitude that it "expected to make it up in management fees . . .," or seek
other compensating advantages. In some cases, control
was purchased solely for the purpose of looting the acquired company.229
The Commission cited both Reynolds and Insuranshares-thetwo
oft quoted sale-of-control looting cases of the forties-in further
support of this obvious distinction between (1) disgorgement of
the illegal premium-bribe and (2) damages, only distantly related,
for harm later inflicted by the successor contr6leur (the outgoing
23 0
contr6leur would be liable only on proof of foreseeability).
Damages and Damages
Understandably, in the early sale-of-control years of the fifties the Commission did not even allude to the very real damages
intimately connected with the actual premium-bribery-not distantly related, as with post-sale looting-for which disgorgement
is the primary sanction.
Courts have characteristically been unable to comprehend the fact that mere disloyalty, without the slightest
subsequent wrong, without any admixture of dollar loss
to the trust or dollar gain to the trustee, is a very real
2 31
injury to the beneficiary.
Thus, irrespective of the disgorgement of the illegal consideration,
damages for the disloyalty of both the incumbent and the successor
contr6leurs are very real consequents of the triple malefaction of
premium-bribery.
At every conceptual turn, incumbent and appointee
faced this obligation in the clear-cut dilemma of a conflict of interest. And thrice each yielded and placed his
229. Id. at 36-37 (quoting Senate Hearings,sipra note 1, at 883, and citing as
examples Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); REPORT, stipra note
11, at 98-107).
230. "Recall that, interestingly, only two sale-of-control courts, Gerdes and
Bosworth, have been able to concentrate on both damages and disposition at the
same time. All the others were deflected'to one or the other." D. BAYNE, supra
note 91, at 267.
231. Id. at 83.
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interests before his beneficiary's. Confronted with an
avowed objective of successor suitability, each chose an
alien consideration, dollars, prestige, personal advantage. The perversion resulted. In giving and taking consideration that belonged to the corporation, each
subordinated the corporate benefit to his own. In making and accepting the appointment each foisted a premium-briber on the future of the firm. Yet each had
pledged a suitable successor when he assumed the custody. Thus these three breaches coalesced into the sin23 2
gle act of disloyalty of a strict trustee.
At one point in the ISI Brief, one might forcibly impute such
subtle-subtle? or patent-insights to the Commission. In quoting Bosworth v. Allen, did the Commission wish to argue for damages for disloyalty-in contradistinction to damages for later
looting, since there was no later looting-in this excerpt?
"[The directors] are liable to account in equity to the
corporation or its representatives, not only for the
money or property in their hands, but also for such as
they fraudulently disposed of or wasted, as well as for the
damages naturally resultingfrom their official misconduct; and
even, as we have recently held, for money received by
2 33
virtue of their office."
This putative point was never pursued, nor did the Commission
adduce any other possible support for such disloyalty damages.
iii.

Dismissal

The last of the three sanctions can be disposed of with dispatch. The Commission reached the summary conclusion that
the successor contr6leur-the Leach Group who premium-bribed
their way into control-must be dismissed from office.
[The Commission] sought, inter alia, a permanent injunction to restrain the director-defendants from serving
as officers and directors of ISI and from serving and acting as directors of the proposed board of directors of the
Trust Fund, and ISI from acting as investment adviser
232. Id. at 231.
233. Brief, supra note 30, at 62 (quoting Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157,
166, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901)) (emphasis added).
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and principal underwriter of the Trust Fund ......
This dismissal was founded on "gross abuse of trust" and mandated by the Investment Company Act:
Its broad and basic purpose is to safeguard the interest
of public investors by providing for the removal of officers, directors, investment advisers, principal underwriters and others from their fiduciary and management
positions if, in a suit by the Commission, it is shown that
they are guilty of "gross misconduct or gross abuse of
trust." So regarded, Section 36, far from being a postscript or statutory aside, performs a vital function in the
23 5
regulatory scheme of the Act.
This was not a gratuitous conclusion, however. The Commission
hhd, after all, expounded the fundamentals of its long line of argumentation, had embodied them in the equitable philosophy of
the Act, and hence could justly conclude that any contr6leurs who
willingly indulged in such "gross abuse of trust" would be subject
to dismissal.
Accordingly . . . they must assume the responsibilities
essential to their fiduciary station and the restraints appropriate to their high office. Were a director of a registered investment company to engage in a transaction
which involved a sale of his office, he would be subject to
removal under Section 36 from any other fiduciary position therein indicated, including that of investment ad23 6
viser or principal underwriter.
Arguably, no violence would be done to the Commission's position to impute to the Commission an appreciation of the subtleties-and hence sanctions-of the total turpitude of the premiumbribe, technically defined as:
(1) The perversion of the judgment of the incumbent
contr6leur, engendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a cause other than suitability, (2) That is,
for consideration illicit in itself. (3) Resulting in the appointment of a candidate unsuitable by reason of his
23 7
own active role in the inducement.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 72.
D. BAYNE, supra note 91, at 257.
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Whether complicity in such turpitude is always and everywhere
sufficient to warrant ouster is a complex matter for another time.
III.

CONCLUSION:

THE COMMISSION FLEES THE FIELD

The rest is anticlimactic. The resounding defeat in SEC v.
Insurance Securities, Inc. must have sapped all the Commission's energy and will:

We hold that the terms "gross misconduct and gross
abuse of trust," as used in § 36 of the act, were not intended to embrace a transaction of the kind described in
23 8
the amended complaint.
That was 1958. Thenceforward the word for the SEC was
'domitable.'
The outstanding opinion of Judge Friendly, in 1971, in the
Second Circuit's Rosenfeld v. Black 239 was starkly contra to Insurance Securities:
We start from one of the "well-established principles of equity," recognized in Insuranced Securities itself,

..."that a personal trustee, corporate officer or director, or other person standing in a fiduciary relationship
with another, may not sell or transfer such office for personal gain." There are ample authorities to support this
proposition: Sugden v. Crossland .... (1856); Gaskell v.
Chambers, . . . (1858); McClure v. Law, ...
(1899);
Porter v. Healy .... (1914) .... 240

Here was the blessing of the Second Circuit on the very philosophy of the Commission so forcefully espoused over the 20 years,
1936 to 1956.
But even this failed to arouse the enervated Commission.
The nadir was reached in 1975. After decades of dickering-

the fine Byzantine hand of the ICI was certainly in evidence-the
Commission sent to the Congress an amorphous compromise to
the sale-of-control controversy. (The Senate Committee Report
employed the oft-used euphemism: "[C]larify the law in light of
238. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 651
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
239. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
240. Id. at 1342.
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109

Rosenfeld." 24 1 Translate as 'substantially emasculate.')
The practical result of the 1975 amendments was a condonation of premium-bribery in the sale of control of investment
companies.
An investment adviser . . .may receive any amount
or benefit in connection with . . .the change in control
242

Dilation on the minutiae would be otiose. The point now remains: What effect will this 'open letter' have on the Securities
and Exchange Commission? On the Congress? Or, for that matter, on the legal community in general?
241. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S.REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1975).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(0)(1) (1982).
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